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ARTICLES

Katrina's Window: Localism, Resegregation,
and Equitable Regionalism
DAVID D. TROUTTt
The promise of [New Orleans] is the lesson that can be learned
from that city. At its best, when the people are doing what they do
naturally-blending a seamless culture-it has a oneness about it
that very few places in the rest of this country has [sic]. New
Orleans' promise is1 [it] can teach America how to be America. If
anybody's listening.
The Negro has indicated tremendous concern about his suspected
confinement to the first ward. At almost every one of the Planning
Board meetings, collectively they have stated they do not feel that
any residential use should be allowed to remain in the first ward.
In piercing through what they say, what they really mean is don't
keep us in the first ward, let us live where our income or our
desires allow us. You have a tremendous pressure building up in
your community on the part of the non-whites to go across the

t Professor of Law and Justice John J. Francis Scholar, Rutgers Law School-

Newark. I wish to thank Derrick Bell and John Payne for their thoughtful
comments on early drafts of this Article. I am also grateful for the feedback I
received from participants after presenting many of these ideas at the First
Annual Critical Race Theory Seminar at UCLA Law School as well as before
policymakers at the Institute for Regional and Community Transformation. I
am deeply indebted to Maritza Braswell for her thoroughness and ingenuity in
providing outstanding research assistance for this Article, as well as to Dennis
Kim-Prieto in the library. I learned a lot from the many gracious people I
interviewed in New Orleans. All mistakes are mine.
1. Interview by PBS with John Scott, Artist, in New Orleans, La. (Feb. 12,
2007).
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INTRODUCTION

Like so many images and incidents from the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, the decision by the
Jefferson Parish police to close the Gretna Bridge to
evacuees fleeing the flooded city three days after the storm
has become a metaphor for a damaged social contract.
Witnesses, mostly black, reported police, mostly white,
firing warning shots over their heads and angrily denying
them passage through the West Bank suburb. 3 Police
spokesmen asserted that mayhem had begun to ensue, that
the parish's resources were taxed after busing evacuees,
and that New Orleans was a better rescue point. 4 But the
public reactions were telling: Jefferson Parish residents
praised their police for keeping outsiders out, outsiders filed
civil rights lawsuits, 5 and the national public took umbrage
at another apparent instance of callous official indifference.
Yet the Gretna Bridge incident reflects something more
complicated and less often acknowledged about New
Orleans-as-metaphor for America's social contract after the
August 2005 storm. It demonstrates the importance of citysuburb boundaries-jurisdictional borders, specifically-in
2. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 110 (2d
Cir. 1970) (quoting the city's planning consultant's advice to the Planning and
Development Board in February 1968).
3. See Bruce Hamilton, Evacuees Recount Gunfire at Bridge Blockade;
Gretna, Jeff Officials Defend Katrina Action, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Feb. 26, 2006, at Al.
4. See id. The official characterizations of mayhem, looting, and crime in and
outside of New Orleans during the immediate aftermath of the storm, were
often wrong and sometimes fatal. Perpetuated by black local officials (e.g., New
Orleans Mayor Ray C. Nagin and Police Chief Eddie Compass) as well as
national news media correspondents, the reports of widespread lawlessness fit a
set of preconceived beliefs about the largely black poor devastated by the
flooding, justified a slower, militarized response from rescuers and may have
delayed critical rescues for sickly and dehydrated survivors. For a full
discussion of the implications of racial framing that occurred in the storm
coverage, see Cheryl Harris & Devon Carbado, Loot or Find?, in AFTER THE
STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA 86
(David Dante Troutt ed., 2006).
5. See Paul Purpura, Court Explores Evacuees' Right to Cross Bridge;
Gretna,Police Chief Face KatrinaLawsuit, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan.
25, 2007, at B1.
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the social identification of space and safety, and how under
what I call legal localism, a suburban locality's police
powers are routinely used to affirm expectations segregated
by both race and class. In fact, there have been several
defensive exercises of local authority in the post-Katrina
environment, including St. Bernard Parish's enactment of
an ordinance preventing homeowners from renting out their
homes to anyone other than a blood relative without a
permit,6 a Jefferson Parish resolution barring construction
of any multi-family housing with the use of state-issued tax
credits, 7 and statements by the St. Tammany Parish sheriff
warning people with dreadlocks or 'chee wee hairstyles"'
that they could 'expect to be getting a visit from a sheriffs
deputy."'8
By legal localism, I am referring to both the ideology of
local governance that is central to most scholarship on local
government law as well as its legal sense, codified in
decades of state law decisions that combined with private
industry actors and federal policies to build a fortified
suburbia around the nation's great cities, and whose rules
of exclusion were ultimately upheld against constitutional
attack by a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s.
Legal localism, I argue here, is the legal form of the
American Dream and the template for our social contract.
For the mostly white suburban parishes that comprise the
New Orleans metropolitan area, legal localism is the formal
triumph of a long historical process of what Arnold Hirsch
called "Americanization." 9 In this analysis, New Orleans is
not just any American city. It is perhaps the American city,
reflecting the struggle between urban potential and racial
identity. Its history of racial and caste complexity before
Reconstruction, the geographic barriers to its expansion,
the sometimes violent ebb and flow of its race relations, the
ideological battles over equality and Jim Crow segregation,
and its ultimate white flight to sprawling suburbs which
6. See Bill Quigley, Editorial, Eighteen Months After Katrina, TRUTHOUT,
Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/022707N.shtml.
7. See id.
8. Id. (quoting Sheriff Jack Strain).
9. Arnold R. Hirsch, Simply a Matter of Black and White: The
Transformation of Race and Politics in Twentieth-Century New Orleans, in
CREOLE NEW ORLEANS: RACE AND AMERICANIZATION 262 (Arnold R. Hirsch &
Joseph Logsdon eds., 1992); see discussion infra p. 1118.
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left behind national extremes of concentrated black poverty
and urban decline represented-before Katrina-a mirror
to the country's failures of residential organization. However,
after Katrina, when even the President's omission of the
city's recovery in his January 2007 State of the Union
address suggested the depth of political fatigue around the
meaning of disaster, New Orleans is a window to the scope
and content of metropolitan law and policy reform in the
United States.
In most law and policy analyses concerned with poverty
and even structural inequality, there is a tendency to focus
narrowly within the hardship, at the intersection of
marginality, or at least to stay on the city side of the bridge.
The flaw in that focus yielded the sort of national confusion
around promised post-Katrina discussions of race and class.
Without a comparative perspective on poverty and the middleclass---or what I have earlier described as an interdependence
between "antimarkets" and "metamarkets"l 0-people
lack
meaningful context. So, the conversation rarely occurred or
lasted for long and, at this writing, the story of New
Orleans' displaced poor will likely become one of accidental
migrations to an uneven diaspora. 11
Yet Hurricane Katrina nevertheless revealed many
randomly related "truths" about the kinds of lives
Americans live and where they live them. First, "white
flight" is not a historical concept, but remains an accurate
descriptor for the residential settlement patterns of most
white Americans--outside of large cities. 12 Second, cities
10. David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket
Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 427 (2000) (representing the foundation article to the
theory of antimarkets, the potential role of consumer principles and an
introduction to a legal paradigm for economic development in ghetto areas of
American cities).
11. See Shaila Dewan, Road to New Life After Katrina Is Closed to Many,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2007, at Al (describing the continuing struggles to find
work, housing and stability among Katrina survivors unable to return to New
Orleans).
12. However, some important recent scholarship on Southern suburbanization
does not fully agree with the way this term is used. For instance, as Matthew D.
Lassiter writes, "[t]he interrelationship between suburban expansion and urban
retrenchment represents the most important framework for investigating
political realignment in postwar America, but the overemphasis on the
metaphor of 'white flight' reduces suburbanization to an appendage of urban
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are still the repositories of political disfavor, even contempt,
"raced" by suburban development patterns as a synonym
for costly black failure and legitimate white fear. 13 Third,
racial and economic segregation are as much the norm
today in America as they were, on average, over the civil
rights era.14 Fourth, whatever one may think of integration
or the personal factors contributing to persistent poverty,
segregation works on particular groups as an instrument of
social and economic marginalization; the chronic absence
of resources that results for the undesirable objects of
segregation-largely poor and working-class blackscontributes to cumulative disadvantages which are even
harder to overcome. 15 Fifth, segregation accompanies suburban
sprawl and enclavism, which creates economic and
environmental waste, a succession of declining communities
and disparities between middle-class and more affluent
localities within a metropolitan area. 16 The New Orleans
history and provides an incomplete account of the development of metropolitan
space." MATHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE

SUNBELT SOUTH 9 (2006). Undoubtedly, whites fled cities for suburbs after
World War II for many more reasons than fear or contempt of racial integration.
In many cases, including that of New Orleans, lending rules and real estate
industry offerings made the suburbs more attractive and less expensive than
continuing to rent in cities. See generally Dolores Hayden, Building the
American Way: Public Subsidy, Private Space, in THE SUBURB READER 273
(Becky M. Nicolaides & Andrew Wiese eds., 2006) (describing cost structures
and public subsidies to homeowners and developers during the pre- and postwar suburban housing booms).
13. See JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MY EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN

THE AGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1945-1975, at 6-8 (2006) (summarizing the range of
reactions, including shock and fear, among ordinary white Southerners as
learned through personal narratives).
14. See LEWIS MUMFORD CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN AND REG'L RESEARCH,
ETHNIC DIVERSITY GROWS, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND 1

(2001), available at http://mumford.albany.edu/census/WholePop/WPreport/
MumfordReport.pdf (providing an analysis of trends in residential segregation
between 1980 and 2000, and concluding that "[r]esidential segregation among
blacks and whites remains high in cities and in suburbs around the country.
There were some signs of progress in the 1980s, with a five-point drop in the
segregation index (from 73.8 to 68.8). The change continued at a slower rate in
the 1990s (a decline of just under 4 points) .... [A]t this pace it may take forty
more years for black-white segregation to come down even to the current level
of Hispanic-white segregation").
15. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). See also

the discussion infra pp. 1128-33.
16. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Sprawl, in SPRAWL CITY: RACE,
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region illustrated all of these phenomena before Katrina,
which, despite its rich history, resembled most of
metropolitan America.
This Article seeks to provide analytic connective tissue
between the tragedy of cities like New Orleans and the
underlying doctrines of marginalization embodied in our
most favored local government laws. I do so by telling a
historical narrative of residential organization, critiquing
localism, and ultimately arguing for principles of metropolitan
governance and land use regulation which I call equitable
regionalism. Many more capable scholars have done the
same before me. 17 However, I hope this Article offers the
continuing discourse three distinct threads of analysis. First,
it provides a history of race, space, and class in New Orleans
that
demonstrates
how
tenuous
the
process
of
Americanization was over its embattled development, and
how the resulting mythologies eclipsed a vision of
urbanization that seems all but lost now. My aim is to
demonstrate that New Orleans' urban exceptionalism was
lost long before Katrina, but in the aftermath its liberal
precepts appear worthy of revival. Second, the Article
critiques legal localism as more than a good doctrine with
POLITICS, AND PLANNING IN ATLANTA 1, 2-7 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 2000)

(describing many of the negative effects of sprawl on cities and older suburbs).
17. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartI-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our
Localism 1]; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism I1];
Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities,99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999);
Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter:Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000)
[hereinafter
Cashin,
Localism, Self-Interest]; Scott
L.
Cummings,
Recentralization: Community Economic Development and the Case for
Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131 (2004); Jon C. Dubin, From
Junkyards to Gentrification:Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in LowIncome Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1993); Richard Thompson
Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial
Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997); Jerry Frug, The Geography of
Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1064-68 (1996); Georgette C. Poindexter,
Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Distribution of Poverty-Related
Problems, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1995); John A. Powell, The
Tensions Between Integration and School Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655
(2001); Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local
Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83;
cf. David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field
from the Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261 (2005).
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inequity-producing flaws. Legal localism, I argue, is the
modern successor to racial segregation, an instrument
effectively shielded from constitutional attack by the proxy
of economic discrimination.' 8 In particular, the Supreme
Court rulings of the 1970s, which insulated localism from
attack also contributed to the cultural assertions of color-blind
innocence that characterize contemporary discussions of
racial difference. Finally, I argue that the twin goals of
saving cities and investing in the social capital of the
concentrated urban poor can only come about through
dedicated reform of our legal rules along the principle of
equitable regionalism. Political and empirical realities now
show that this principle is capable of a workable, though
anti-localist, premise: What is good for the poor is also good
for the middle-class.
Part I examines the history of race relations across
spatial relationships in New Orleans, with particular
emphasis on how American thinking produced a binary
capitulation-two races, one white, one black-despite the
resistance of radical Creoles of color and substantial barriers
to spatial distance imposed by the climate and the landscape.
That history is directly complicit in the vulnerabilities that
produced the continuing disasters for so many after
Katrina. This Part concludes with an analysis of how the
late-breaking development of suburbia around New Orleans
followed the same segregated patterns seen elsewhere
during the post-war period. Part II asserts that what
segregation started, localism codified and has proved a
more formidable guarantor of middle-class wealth and
privilege on the one hand, and concentrated black poverty on
the other. Specifically, this Part examines the jurisprudential
edifice fortifying segregation in the more durable form of
race-neutral rules of local autonomy developed by state
legislatures and courts, but ultimately, as I argue, given the
Supreme Court's imprimatur in a series of illustrative cases
18. I use the term "legal localism" to distinguish the legal constellation of
rules, court decisions, and rationales supporting local autonomy from the
cultural imagination from which it comes. Localism as an idea is much larger
than legal localism as a set of doctrines, though the idea could not have nearly
the organizational influence in American life without the complicity of the
latter. Legal localism, for example, could have focused primarily on large cities
as its prototype, rather than smaller suburban municipalities, favoring and
empowering the former over the latter. Yet that would have contradicted the
exclusionary impulses animating localism.
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decided in the critical decade of the 1970s. These rules
reproduce racial and economic segregation through their
interaction with economic rationalism, decentralization,
consumption, and political fragmentation as well as black
middle-class antipathy toward integration. The analysis
modifies previous analyses of the creation of American
ghettoes during the middle decades of the twentieth
century 19 by attributing more responsibility for the
emergence of a so-called "urban underclass" in the 1980s
and 1990s to the consolidation of legal localism in the
1970s. Part III argues that cities cannot expect to command
the resources to provide adequately for the excluded poor or
to sustain economic growth without regional alliances for,
among other things, distributing fair housing obligations
and sharing tax revenues. These reforms flow from a
principle called equitable regionalism. Like some other
regionalist proposals, it is grounded in planning principles.
These, I propose, should follow a neighborhood, rather than
municipality, model, as demonstrated by some of the
experiments currently underway in New Orleans' rebuilding
efforts.
I. THE HISTORY AND REALITY OF NEW ORLEANS'
AMERICANIZATION

New Orleans' steep social and economic decline before
Hurricane Katrina is well known. Its wrenching poverty,
murder rates, failing public schools, political corruption,
and hypersegregation 20 belied the positive gloss of its "Big
Easy" notoriety. Less remembered, however, is its heritage
as one of America's first great urban centers, which
necessarily includes its formative struggles over racial
integration, interethnic cooperation, and the politics of land
settlement. This Part examines New Orleans' eventual
"Americanization"-as the historian Arnold Hirsch and
others use the term 21-in order to illustrate how a failing
19. See, e.g., ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND
HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960, at 40-67 (1983).

20. The term "hypersegregation" describes an area in which at least four of
five possible measures of segregation-unevenness, isolation, clustering,
centralization, and concentration-occur over a particular threshold. See
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 15, at 74-77.
21. Hirsch, supra note 9.
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city in contemporary terms, failed long ago (in fits and
starts) to be an urban model for the nation.
Americanization, as I intend to use it, refers to two critical
phenomena. First, it is the process of binary capitulation by
which a polyglot city of French- and Spanish-identified
Creoles, Irish and German immigrant laborers (and later
Italians), and 'Yankee" American protestants became
"white," while free and enslaved black people from Africa,
various parts of the South as well as Haiti, became
identified as "black"-with a significant portion identifying
themselves as "Creole" in the last but continuing memory
of original differences. Second, Americanization is the
exploitation of this binary capitulation to institutionalize
typical American residential patterns, especially racial
segregation, upon a physical landscape that now represents,
literally, the fatal implications of marginalized spaces.
New Orleans' reputation for racial integration is
sometimes exaggerated relative to its rapid segregation
over the last fifty years. As the following discussion shows,
"blacks" and "whites" lived in much greater proximity to
each other in the city for a longer period of time than in
most American cities. In this sense, the struggle to
Americanize into segregated living patterns was completed
later than it was for most hypersegregated cities. What is
most instructive here, however, is that the process was a
historical struggle, with multiple forces as engaged in a
conflict over the meaning of racial identity as they were
over segregation. Further, New Orleans' struggles over
racial identification of both its people and its spaces would
not likely have been so pronounced had the unique physical
characteristics of its location not demanded density.
"America's Western Capital" was as much a critical port
city as an island, surrounded by the Mississippi, Lake
Ponchartrain, vast swamplands, and impassable marshes
until late in the nineteenth century. Its harsh topography
necessarily invited density, if not verticality, so that, as the
city grew in population, both classes and races lived closer
to each other in or near the high ground grid of the Vieux
Carre. 22 According to some geologists, the area was 'a land
between earth and sea-belonging to neither and

22. See PEIRCE F. LEWIS,
LANDSCAPE 20 (2003).

NEW ORLEANS:

THE MAKING OF AN URBAN
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alternately claimed by both."' 23 Americanization as a spatial
reality, therefore, would not take its full shape until the
possibility of suburban sprawl transformed the region in
the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
A. 'Americanization"I: The White Supremacist Roots of
New Orleans' Geography
Antebellum New Orleans was complex and defiant of
generalizations because so many fixed categories in
American racial experience were routinely subverted by its
customs. Despite laws designed to maintain the supremacy
of whiteness in the racial order, even slaves' acceptance of a
subordinated status was superficial. 24 Social, sexual,
political, and economic connections among whites and
blacks were too varied and frequent. 25 Ownership of black
slaves by free Negroes is illustrative. In 1830, 735 Negroes
owned 2,351 Negro slaves. 26 While the phenomenon of New
Orleans blacks owning slaves is sometimes characterized as
part of a Franco-French (and lighter-skinned) elite of free
Creole hegemony over darker-skinned blacks, many
"slaves" were family members who were subsequently
manumitted. 27 Nor could the categories of white and black
enjoy universal references in a tightly configured city
developed in an efficient grid on the high ground along the
Mississippi River. In 1810, the city's population was 36.7%
white, 28.7% free people of color, and 34.6% slaves. 28 By
1850, it was 76.9% white, 8.5% free people of color, and
14.6% slaves. 29 But during that span, the "white"
population had changed many times over as German, Irish,
then Italian laborers entered the port city alongside
existing whites of "American," Spanish, and French
23. Id. at 34 (quoting CHARLES R. KOLB & J.R. VAN LOPIK, U.S. ARMY
ENGINEER WATERWAYS EXPERIMENT STATION TECHNICAL REPORT 3-483, GEOLOGY
OF THE MississiPPi RIVER DELTAIC PLAIN, SOUTHEASTERN LOuISIANA (1958)).
24. JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS: 1860-1880, at 9 (1973).

25. See id.
26. Id. at 11.

27. Id. ("[Sluch masters entered 501 of the 1,353 manumission petitions in
the emancipation court between 1827 and 1851.").
28. Joseph Logsdon & Caryn Cosse Bell, The Americanization of Black New
Orleans, 1850-1900, in CREOLE NEW ORLEANS, supra note 9, at 206.

29. Id.

2008]

KATRINA'S WINDOW

1119

origin. 30 Serious social antagonisms between the latter
two-the old guard who had given the city its distinctive
flavor and the Eastern elites of the country's westward
expansion-fueled the divided shape of the city's geography
as well as its ultimate identity. 31 Yet despite expressions of
white supremacy and fear of blacks typical of many parts of
America, 32 social admixture prevented racial identity in
New Orleans from adhering to binary categories and instead,
for both blacks and whites, remained multitudinous.
"Americanization" refers first to the process by which a
polyglot city struggling to incorporate multiple cultural
influences discovers and institutionalizes racial segregation.
Segregation-the de jure and de facto forced identification
of racialized space-is rooted in the meanings associated
with land and place. "[T]he city's social history was both
paralleled and influenced by its physical development. If
the city's geography had once forced New Orleanians into
intimate association, physical changes in modern New
Orleans facilitated the drive of white supremacists toward
racial segregation and polarization. ' 33
This first aspect of Americanization did not occur
swiftly or linearly, but by pendular accretions. During the
1850s, the pendulum swung away from the city's integrated
traditions and economic opportunities which had attracted
ambitious free "American" blacks, and blacks saw a vanishing
of freedoms. In 1852, for example, three municipalities
merged and racial oppression increased. 34 It was a period
in which many more "American" whites came to the city. 35
The city's population grew along with the sources of
cultural influence. By 1860, free people of color were only
6.4% of the population, but their absolute numbers-

30. See LEWIS, supra note 22, at 63.
31. See id. at 44-47. There was deep animosity for the Americans among the
Franco-Spanish residents of New Orleans, and the distrust and contempt for
ways and beliefs was mutual. See id. Canal Street came to divide the American
sector from the city, and in 1836 New Orleans was divided into three separate
municipalities which reflected the political extent of the conflicts. See id.
32. See BLASSINGAME, supra note 24, at 16.
33. Logsdon & Bell, supra note 28, at 197.
34. Id. at 208.
35. See id. at 206.
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10,939-were significant. 36
Blacks with Franco-Caribbean origins-mostly from
Haiti and roughly identifiable as Creole 37-often embraced
the principles of social equality, full political rights, and
liberty reflected in the French and Haitian revolutions. 38
Like the founders a generation before them, Creole
"radicals" succeeded in passing a state constitution in 1868
that "mandated the integration of all government facilities,
including public schools, and also all private businesses
licensed by the state to serve the public. ' 39 But there was
tremendous and violent backlash by whites and disagreement
among blacks about how far to push against the segregationist
tide. By 1866, a year of race riots between whites and blacks,
New Orleans blacks experienced a growing divide.40 This
intraracial divide would remain a critical fulcrum in the
contested meanings given to race and space.
Before the civil war, the racial geography of the citythe early foundation for what would become the second
phase of Americanization-showed a patchwork of blacks
throughout. Many blacks lived in the French Quarter.
Others lived among the white households for whom they
often worked as domestics, in "small, nuclear clusters"
behind "superblocks" fronted by wealthy boulevard homes. 41
The poorest blacks, however, lived in battures or
backswamps, poorly drained, unkempt, mosquito-infested

36. Id.
37. See infra note 54.
38. See Logsdon & Bell, supra note 28, at 209.
39. Id. at 241.
40. See id. at 240-41. Disagreements over whether to seek universal
suffrage were a harbinger of the differences between DuBois and Washington
decades later-or Malcolm and Martin many years later-with some
demanding full equality and others urging caution and self-help. The militants
won, however briefly, when blacks in Louisiana gained suffrage as well as
integrated government facilities and public schools. The violence reported by
the creole-led Tribune may have helped passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Reconstruction Acts. "It was, ultimately, a white-black 'American'
alliance that eclipsed creole eminence and weakened resistance to a policy of
racial separation." Id. at 195.
41. LEwis, supra note 22, at 50-51 ("If America had to have racial
segregation, the New Orleans pattern was less malevolent than that of most
northern cities.").
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areas near the river. 42 Over time, the latter would come to
symbolize the more familiar pattern of residential
organization we see today.
B. The Civil War, Reconstruction,and Radical Creolism
With the Civil War came an intensification of racialized
emotion. Fear has always been a key ingredient of racial
animus, but after the war humiliation also affected
Southern whites' views of themselves generally and the
configuration of a city like New Orleans in particular.
"Humiliated by their defeat in a war in which blacks had
marched in the legions of the victors, southern white men
returned from the field of battle to find the Negro in places
which they felt were their own." 43 Calls for violence against
blacks grew more frequent, clashing with the growing
desire of blacks across the South to see their new freedoms
expressed in respect for black "manhood"-equal justice,
political participation, suffrage, integrated schools and
public facilities, and control of their own institutions. 44 In
New Orleans, Reconstruction brought many of these things,
as well as the makings of a white segregationist
backlash
45
designed to humiliate black citizens in turn.
"Nowhere did Reconstruction begin so early or advance
so far in its legal challenges as in New Orleans." 46 Radical
black Creole reformers who had lost their dominance by
1870 were briefly re-ascendant during the period as the
racial pendulum swung again. However, despite the
political gains the reformers had helped secure for blacks in
the 1870s, there were discernible tensions among blacks in
the city over how far to push for full citizenship rights.
While the backlash against Reconstruction was powerful
throughout the South, these tensions ironically may have
42. See id. at 51-52.
43. BLASSINGAME, supra note 24, at 174.

44. See id. at 176-77 (quoting the black New Orleans Tribune, which
reportedly wrote: "We wish to be respected and treated as men-not as
Africans, or negroes, or colored people, but as Americans and American
citizens.").
45. Interestingly, Blassingame notes that "[t]he word humiliation appeared
more frequently than any other in Negro catalogues of the impact of segregation
on them." Id. at 179.
46. Logsdon & Bell, supra note 28, at 216.
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produced a strength in Louisiana sufficient to hold back the
retrenchment longer than elsewhere. 47 But it came.
Resegregation occurred in 1877 and again in the 1879
"Redeemer" constitution. 48 Radical Creoles of color such as
Aristide Mary, Louis A. Martinet, and Rodolphe Desdunes,
philosophical forebears of the modern civil rights
movement, sought recourse in the federal courts. 49 In 1890,
they formed the American Citizens Equal Rights Association
and brought two lawsuits; the most famous was named for
the Creole activist who challenged segregated train cars,
Homer Plessy, biologically just one-eighth black. 50 That
legal defeat was devastating, leading New Orleans to
very similar to other
become, "in its race relations,
'51
American cities in the South."
Following Reconstruction, legal segregation would take
many forms, particularly with the late nineteenth century
rise of Jim Crow, which had profound effects on the social
construction of a racial calculus and its physical manifestations
in urban land. Cheryl Harris has argued that this process
significantly contributed to the identification of property in
whiteness. 52 This, too, is a feature of what Hirsch called
Americanization. The emerging racial calculus that, by law,
devalued even a little black heredity, submerged ethnicity
and, for those who were privileged to have one, demanded a
choice. White Creoles, for instance, became white. "In an
age of racial totalitarianism, the rapid assimilation of white
immigrants and the fierce determination of white creoles to
link their identity to a biological rather than a cultural
how Americanized white
heritage sharply demonstrated
53
New Orleans had become."
As segregation systematized the conditioning of social
and economic benefits in New Orleans, it not surprisingly
revealed the trade in skin color. That is, a system that
creates both property and social relations in biological

47. See id. at 249-51.
48. See id. at 253.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 257. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
51. Logsdon & Bell, supra note 28, at 259.
52. Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
53. Logsdon & Bell, supra note 28, at 190.
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identity implies markets of trade in those "values." The
color line in New Orleans had-and has-always reflected a
certain caste system of racial lineage among blacks; the
very term "Creole" remains charged today because of its
association with lighter-skinned elites. 54 Whites and white
institutions encouraged the divisions among blacks. During
the antebellum period, most free Negroes were mulatto,
while most slaves were black-77% and 74%, respectively,
in 1860.55 The former were legally barred from interacting
with the latter. 56 After Reconstruction, and notwithstanding
the fierce advocacy of equal rights by radical Creoles of
color, black Creoles often sought to gain the status benefits
of assimilation that white Creoles chose. 57 In the 1875
census, hundreds of Louisiana mulattoes reported themselves
as "white. 58s "In all probability, from 100 to 50059 Negroes
became 'white' every year from 1875 to the 1890s."
II. AMERICANIZATION II: TECHNOLOGY AND

CHANGES TO THE

LAND UNDER JIM CROW AND FORMAL LAND USE LAWS

A. Technology
Jim Crow and the separate-but-equal doctrine, upheld
by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, demonstrated

54. Definitions abound, including those limited to time periods. In the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many simply defined Creole as
indigenous to Louisiana or New Orleans, as opposed to born elsewhere,
particularly slaves. See CREOLE NEW ORLEANS, supra note 9, at xi n.4. There is
evidence that for a while after that, the term was used to describe people of
European descent born in the Americas. See Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, The
Formation of Afro-Creole Culture, in CREOLE NEW ORLEANS, supra note 9, at 58,
60-61. This all-white usage of the term was especially prevalent during
Reconstruction. See CREOLE NEW ORLEANS, supra note 9, at 98; see also ALINE
ST. JULIEN, COLORED CREOLE: COLOR CONFLICT AND CONFUSION IN NEW ORLEANS
(1987); Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., Creoles and Americans, in CREOLE NEW ORLEANS,
supra note 9, at 131, 134, 138-41. However, it is far from clear how the term

came to hold its contemporary connotation of a black person with longstanding
roots in New Orleans and French, Spanish, or Haitian lineage.
55. BLASSINGAME, supra note 24, at 21.
56. Id.
57. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 262, 265.
58. BLASSINGAME, supra note 24, at 201.
59. Id.
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the role of law in facilitating the creation of a post-Civil War
racial marketplace. Law codified the hegemony of American
race perceptions-white supremacy-and institutionalized the
racial choices available to whites or to those blacks who
could stake some property-like claim in their origins. For
the latter, this was increasingly difficult to do. The
American racial calculus was deliberately narrow and
simple-the white-black binary. Even after Plessy, the legal
status of partial black identity was nebulous, though its
social significance was clear.60 To be white under
segregation meant, of course, to have at least some choices
about the exercise of one's trade value; to be black meant to
have few to none. 61 Because of technological changes, those
choices greatly expanded for New Orleans' whites by the
turn of the century.
Pumps allowed the landscape to expand beyond the edges
60. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) ("It is true that the
question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to constitute a colored
person . . . is one upon which there is a difference of opinion in the different
states .

. .

. But these are questions to be determined under the laws of each

state, and are not properly put in issue in this case. Under the allegations of his
petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance whether, under
the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored race."); Lee
v. New Orleans Great N. R.R. Co., 51 So. 182 (1910) (suggesting that "persons of
color" included persons with as little as one-sixteenth African ancestry); see also
TED GIOIA, THE HISTORY OF JAZZ 34 (1997) ("[T]he most decisive turning point
was the passage of the Louisiana Legislative Code of 1894 that designated that
anyone of African ancestry was a Negro."); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY
CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 153-54 (1987) ("Determination of

race was wholly impossible to be made . . . by any tribunal, much less by the
conductor of a train ....

In addition, neither federal nor Louisiana law had

defined the limits of race [and] . . . under the Louisiana separate car law the
determination depended on the conductor's arbitrary judgment."); Christine B.
Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African
Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1178 n.72 (1997)
("Louisiana did not statutorily define Blackness [but] did adopt via its Supreme
Court an 'appreciable mixture of negro blood' standard."); Orville Lee, Legal
Weapons for the Weak? Democratizing the Force of Words in an Uncivil Society,
26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 847, 868 (2001) (citing VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY
DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA 2 (1986)) (referring to

"a 1970 Louisiana statute that made 1/32 'Negro blood' the dividing line
between white and black"); Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in
the United States, 112 YALE L.J. 1473, 1507 (2003) ("After the Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled that anyone of traceable African origin was 'colored,' that
state's Bureau of Vital Statistics assumed an equally powerful role in
maintaining the racial order.").

61. This remains the case, as the discussion of Hurricane Katrina, infra,
demonstrates.
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of the Mississippi. First legislated in 1899, the city installed
pumps which within a decade radically transformed the
livable environment by draining large sections of swampland
near Lake Ponchartrain.6 2 New canals soon followed along
with progressive expansion of sewerage systems to more of
the city.6 3 The geographer Craig Colten has argued that
Progressive Era principles mostly informed the distribution
of new engineering technology around the city, but its
inequitable consequences were determined by Jim Crow
land laws and policies:
Despite the influence of racism, the public works programme
followed Progressive Era engineering principles and Jim Crow
emerged through overt real estate policies. A process-oriented
analysis clearly shows that drainage opened new areas to Black
residences. In this respect, drainage contributed to segregation.
Allowing African-Americans to occupy these low areas reflected
established patterns of turning low-value land associated with
environmental problems over to minority populations. The
development of lakefront property required drainage,6 4but limiting
sales to whites was a function of real estate practices.

In the 1920s, the Orleans Levee District helped
stimulate a building boom and a northern population shift
by securing two thousand acres of waterfront real estate. 65
The combination of high costs and de jure discrimination
ensured that these newly developed areas were occupied by
whites. Black population expansion occurred in the
floodplain.66 These events in the physical and racial
configuration of the city reflected law. Louisiana passed a
statute in 1924 empowering cities of 25,000 people or more
to impose residential segregation; it took the New Orleans
city council a full week to comply. 6 7 Equally important at
62. See CREOLE NEW ORLEANS, supra note 9, at 198.

63. See Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental
Equity in New Orleans, 1890-1930, 28 J. HiST. GEOGRAPHY 237, 247-48 (2002).

64. Id. at 253.
65. See CREOLE NEW ORLEANS, supra note 9, at 198.
66. See id. at 199.
67. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 268. According to Colten's research,
Louisiana Act No. 117 in 1912 authorized cities to enact segregation ordinances
and Act No. 118 in 1924 outlawed integrated neighborhoods, while New Orleans
Ordinance 8037 in 1924 authorized the state acts in the city. Colten, supra note
63, at 256 n.66.
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the time was white Democrats' successful efforts to
disenfranchise all black voters through the use of white
primaries, poll taxes, literacy tests, and the "understanding
clause." 68
B. The Intersection of Jim Crow, Rational Planning,and
Localism
Throughout metropolitan America, the 1920s was also a
critical decade in the advent of formal urban planning tools,
especially after exercise of the police power was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty.6 9 In 1918,
the state of Louisiana passed Act 27, which roughly
inaugurated land use planning-the segregation of certain
kinds of business buildings from residential buildings-for
municipalities of more than 50,000.70 Like many cities, New
Orleans Parish followed the lead of the State Zoning
Enabling Act (SZEA), which was drafted by the federal
Department of Commerce, and adopted the first
comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1929.71 The state
enabling act, which allowed municipalities to create land
use plans at their option, was not passed until 1946.72
There is nothing particularly novel about the land use
regulation adopted by either the State of Louisiana or the
City of New Orleans. Louisiana's enabling act does not
mandate that a municipality adopt a master plan. Instead
it gives each municipality the authority to create a planning
commission, and such commission can adopt its own
comprehensive plan. 73 Furthermore, even where a plan is
adopted, "developers need only the blessing from the City

68. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 268.
69. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396-97
(1926).
70. Stephen D. Villavaso, Planning Enabling Legislation in Louisiana: A
Retrospective Analysis, 45 Loy. L. REV. 655, 657 (1999).

71. See City Archives New Orleans Public Library, Historical Note,
http://nutrias.org/inv/zone1929.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). An attempt to
revise the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance in 2001 was never adopted. See
New Orleans Land Use Plan, Apr. 1999, http://secure.cityofno.com/Portals/
cpc/Land%20Use%20PlanfLand%20Use%20Plan%20(text%20only).pdf.
72. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:101 to :106 (West 2002).

73. See id. § 33:101.
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Council to override the guidelines." 74 None of it is
mandatory. Interjurisdictional cooperation is not required
in any meaningful way. It provides generally for the orderly
exclusion of incompatible uses within municipalities. Most
of
importantly, it expresses the regulatory architecture
7 5
localism, which has remained normative ever since.
What is interesting, as we have seen in the case of
drainage and sewage, is that formal rational planning
devices-which would remain good law today-would
operate alongside and correspond to Jim Crow segregation
laws-which would not. New Orleans was among many
cities that engaged in a variety of racial zoning attempts
before most were struck down by the Supreme Court in
Buchanan v. Warley. 76 For instance, as C. Vann Woodward
74. Brett Clanton, New Orleans City Council Moves Forward with Zoning
Ordinance Revision, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUSINESS, May 27, 2002, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4200/is_20020527/ai-n10172437.
75. The planning process in New Orleans, even before Katrina, has received
substantial criticism, primarily due to the lack of force behind zoning
guidelines. See id. In 2002 critics argued over what should come first: a new city
master plan or new comprehensive zoning ordinances. See id. Many questioned
"the value of revising zoning laws when developers need only the blessing from
the City Council to override the guidelines." Id.
Right after Katrina, various groups, including the Urban Planning
Committee of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission, suggested New
Orleans adopt a new Master Plan and "give it the force of law through a charter
change." BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK COMMISSION URBAN PLANNING COMMITTEE,
ACTION PLAN FOR NEW ORLEANS: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY (2006). Similarly,
other groups, like the Bureau of Governmental Research, suggested that an
effective approach would be to "limit the City Council's role in land-use
decisions," and give "the City Planning Commission and the Board of Zoning
Adjustments ... greater authority." Bruce Eggler, N.O. Urged to Revamp LandUse Policies; Council has too Much Power, Nonprofit Says, NEW ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE, Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://bgr.org/BGR%20in /20the%2ONews/
N.O._urged to revamp-jand-use-policiesTP080406.pdf. This, coupled with a
change in "how members of the two bodies are appointed to try to make them
more professional and nonpolitical," would give neighborhoods a greater voice in
the post-Katrina rebuilding process. Id. "Many of [these] changes ... [were]
designed to give legal force to the master plan for the city's physical
development." Id.; see also Seymour D. Fair, Planning For a New Era: Proposed
Changes for Land Use Decision Making in New Orleans (Aug. 4, 2006),
http://thethirdbattleofneworleans.blogspot.com/2006/08/bureau-ofgovernmentalresearch.html; Stephen D. Villavaso, Growth Management: How Communities
Grow/Change/Redevelop in a Post-Katrina and Post-Kelo World (Sept. 25,
2006), http://www.lorman.com/seminars/teleconference.php?productid=165217
&topic=DEV&pod only= 1.
76. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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wrote in The Strange Career of Jim Crow, the city
"developed a law requiring a person of either race to secure
consent of the majority of persons living in an area before
establishing a residence therein. ' 77 Frustration with the
Court's ruling would embolden other devices that advanced
covenants in leases restricting
segregation such as racial
78
sales to white persons.
III. "DESEGREGATION" AND THE POST-WAR
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MARGINAL SPACES

Segregation intensified after Brown,79 as white
Louisianans manufactured ways to resist the ruling. In
particular, the 1950s saw the rise of the White Citizen's
Council. In 1956, the state passed thirteen pieces of "hate"
legislation; in 1961, it passed ninety-two such acts in
further resistance to school desegregation.8 0 New Orleans
continued to pass segregation ordinances such as Code of
the City of New Orleans section 50-6, which required
prisoner work squads to be "made up wholly of white males
or wholly of colored males,"' and Ordinance No. 828, which
82
required the segregated operation of local taverns.
Politically, the mayoral election in 1961 of a candidate
openly antagonistic to blacks, Vic Schiro, led to conflict and
more political isolation for blacks.8 3 Economically, the
federal government's active collusion with, if not
encouragement of, private discrimination against blacks in

77. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 100-01 (1974).
78. See id. at 101; see also Tyler v. Harmon, 104 So. 200, 201 (La. 1925)
(upholding New Orleans Ordinance 8037, which was enacted under the
authority of Louisiana Act 117 of 1912, and gave municipalities the power to
enact segregation ordinances, and under Louisiana Act 118 of 1924, which
prohibited racial mixing by neighborhood). The case was subsequently
overturned. Tyler v. Harmon, 107 So. 704 (La. 1926), rev'd sub nom. Harmon v.
Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
79. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 281.
81. Pounds v. Theard, 230 So. 2d 861, 862 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (holding the
ordinance unconstitutional).
82. See Pania v. City of New Orleans, 262 F.Supp. 651, 652 (E.D. La. 1967)
(holding that Ordinance No. 828 was unconstitutional).
83. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 283-84. For instance, when faced with the
threat of integrating swimming pools, Schiro closed them. Id. at 288.
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housing and mortgage lending criteria after World War II
contributed as much as any factor to the foundations of
inequality in New Orleans-and across the country-that
took their tangible form in residential relationships.8 4
A. White Flight and Sprawl
The second phase of Americanization-the racial
identification of segregated suburban space-occurred later
in the New Orleans metropolitan area than in many
cities,8 5 mainly because the unforgiving landscape defeated
the economic underpinnings of whiteness-as-valuableproperty until highway and drainage technologies caught
up. The city was rapidly abandoned by whites, losing twothirds of the white population between 1950 and 2000.86
The exodus would change the population dynamics of the
region, transforming New Orleans from a city that was 45%
black in 1970 into one that was 67% black in 2000,87 with
an overall population loss during the same period of 18% or
109,000 people.88 New Orleans' loss was initially
neighboring Jefferson Parish's gain. Jefferson became the
focal point of middle-class white flight, even after
completion of the causeway that linked New Orleans and
St. Tammany Parish.8 9 Residents made known their
hostility to blacks-and the poor generally-as much of the
early exodus coincided with resistance to school

84. For a much fuller discussion of the various modes of economic
discrimination in lending, highway, and urban renewal funding, the promotion
of redlining and other means of discrimination against black, Latino, and
immigrant groups by both governmental and private actors, see Troutt, supra
note 10, at 437-58 (describing, inter alia, an assortment of public subsidies
offered on a discriminatory basis to white borrowers over the first two-thirds of
the twentieth century).
85. Matthew Lassiter describes the process this way: "As in the nation at
large, which operated under its own progressive mythology of racial harmony,
the politics of moderation in the Sunbelt South attempted to move beyond the
Jim Crow system of legal segregation through the spatial policies of suburban
sprawl and urban containment." LASSITER, supra note 12, at 11.
86. LEWIS, supra note 22, at 125.
87. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM
THE PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 9 (2005).

88. Id. at 4.
89. See LEWIS, supra note 22, at 78-80.
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desegregation orders following Brown.90 The middle-class
migration to Jefferson Parish "goes a long way toward
explaining the near absence of a white middle-class in New
Orleans City."91
But Jefferson Parish would not be enough to fulfill
typical patterns of Americanization, and its decline would
follow the city's. 92 By the late 1960s and 1970s, parts of
New Orleans clearly resembled "antimarkets"-sites of
racial and economic negation from white middle-class
norms-and fear of crime and school integration fueled
white desires for even greater geographic distance from
blacks. 93 Sprawl represented geographic, demographic, and
economic trends. The causeways and bridges over Lake
Ponchartrain and the addition of the completed Interstate
10-following Huey Long's "Airline Highway"-had by now
shortened commutes to more distant parishes in the sevenparish New Orleans metropolitan area. 94 By 2000, a
majority of the metropolitan population lived outside New
Orleans; Jefferson Parish's population was nearly equal to
95
the city, and the population of St. Tammany doubled.
Sprawl accompanied economic growth at the expense of the
city as well. Between 1970 and 2000, New Orleans had only
42% of the area's jobs, while employment growth ballooned
in the suburbs, especially St. Tammany. 96 Nevertheless, the
region "de-densified"-i.e., its population per acre actually
decreased by 21%.97 For most of the region's whites, therefore,
90. See id. at 99, 125. According to Lewis, the prevailing attitudes among
whites was that they viewed themselves as a "superior race, and the idea of
living next to blacks as equals was unthinkable." Id. at 125.
91. Id. at 138.
92. Jefferson Parish now has ghettoes. See id.
93. See id. at 127-28. See infra p. 1134-36, for a more detailed discussion of
the term "antimarkets."
94. See LEWIS, supra note 22, at 139. In addition to Orleans (the city),
Jefferson, and St. Tammany, there are St. Bernard, Plaquemines, St. Charles,
and St. John the Baptist.
95. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87.

96. Id. For instance, St. Tammany's gain in its employment base was 431%
over the period, Jefferson's was 157%, and St. Charles' was 148%. Id.
97. Id. at 11. In fact, densities remained constant in the city for over thirty
years as the consumption of metro area land continued to defy natural barriers.
"Between 1982 and 1997, the metropolitan area lost 1.4 percent of its
population. But during the same period of time, the number of new square
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sprawl offered newer homes 98 and shorter commutes 99 on
(usually) higher ground.
Black suburbanization took on a very different cast
despite the growth in the late 1970s and 1980s of a
significant
black
middle-class.
Its
suburbanization
increased only in the older suburb of Jefferson Parish-to
23% of the population in 2000-yet remained low in the
other suburban parishes of the region, and significantly
declined in the parish of greatest economic opportunity, St.
Tammany-from 18% to 10%.100 Middle-class blacks
benefited from an irony of sprawl when a huge subdivision
planned for within the city's borders called "New Orleans
East" went bankrupt in the 1980s following the oil bust. 101
The former swampland along Interstate 10 was sold to
many families eager to flee urban chaos for suburban order
at affordable prices and became "the only major middleclass black suburb in the whole metropolitan area. ' 10 2 The
tragedy of that irony today is that Katrina's storm surges
over Lake Ponchartrain inundated nearly all of New
Orleans East.
B. Public Housing
Just as the dual processes of Americanization overcame
New Orleanians' unique defiance of binary racial identities
and fully segregated spaces, the city's experience with
public housing eventually defied the best early expectations
of the federal program and degenerated into ghettoization.
New Orleans, after all, was one of the first cities to build
public housing after the 1937 Act. 10 3 Though segregated by
miles of urbanized land grew 25 percent. .

. ."

Id. at 10.

98. According to the 2000 Census, the median age of homes in the six
suburban parishes is fairly recent: Jefferson, 1971; St. Bernard, 1972;
Plaquemines, 1975; St. Charles, 1978; St. John the Baptist, 1979; and St.
Tammany, 1983. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS SUMMARY FILE: SF3 CENSUS
DATA, at H035001 (2000).

99. Over half of all workers over the age of sixteen who did not work at
home in the six suburban parishes traveled less than thirty minutes to work in
2000. Id. at P032001.
100. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 10.
101. LEWIS, supra note 22, at 80-81.

102. Id. at 81.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000). The first was Iberville, which supplanted
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race, the first projects would reflect for whites the
reformers' wishes for upward mobility through transitional,
but dignified spaces. 10 4 Indeed, the failure of public housing
for blacks in New Orleans is a microcosm of the failure of
the social contract in the United States. As Martha
Mahoney points out in her case study of the projects created
by the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), what
worked for most white residents of public housing
immediately after World War 11-affordable housing
without social stigma, total geographical isolation or class
over-concentration, and the establishment of a way station
to economic opportunities in a promising private housing
market-was deliberately withheld from black residents of
the city. 0 5 Thus, the subversion of housing goals by
HANO's segregated policies interacted with widespread
private economic discrimination to deprive blacks of the
privileges of a generous citizenship enjoyed by whites.
At least two key factors characterize the dual
trajectories of whites and blacks in public housing. First,
while black turnover rates were low in the projects, high
white turnover rates generally reflected the greater array of
private housing opportunities and jobs available in the postwar local economy. 106 In many instances, whites who
expressed satisfaction with their HANO apartments simply
could not pass up the offer of affordable mortgages for
housing in segregated and increasingly suburban
neighborhoods. 10 7 Such loans were not offered to blacks,
who increasingly doubled up in public housing
as private
markets in the city became less affordable. 0 8
Second, while blacks in public housing got poorer and
whites moved out, HANO built new housing projects closer

the notorious "Storyville" red-light district beside the French Quarter. See
LEWIS, supra note 22, at 132.
104. See Martha Mahoney, Law and Racial Geography:Public Housing and
the Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1283 (1990) ("Whites seem
to have treated the segregated projects as a step en route to the private market,
or as a cushion to financial setbacks.").
105. Id. at 1253.
106. See id. at 1282.
107. See id. at 1275.
108. See id. at 1276.
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to each other or expanded existing ones. 109 As neighborhoods
declined, discriminatory lending policies that trapped
blacks-specifically, redlining and other forms of
disinvestment-prevented them from markedly improving
their communities. In this way, HANO's siting practices
must be viewed as another dimension of the city's
Americanization, since it departs radically from the history
of more heterogeneous neighborhood organization. HANO,
together with the relocation of white, middle-class
households and jobs to the suburbs, was deliberately
segregating interests and making ghettoes. New Orleans
had no majority-black neighborhoods until 1976,110 yet by
that time public housing was almost entirely black."1
Public housing, as we will see in the next section, is
now "raced." That is, it is identified less with the failure of
governmental policies or democratically enforced prejudices
and more with the poor black residents concentrated within
the projects. The character aspects of these identifications
necessarily combine an abstract individual's race and her
class because, from the distance of segregated perception,
they cannot be told apart. Beyond racism, the associations
between persistently poor black populations and drugs,
crime, gangs, and antisocial conduct run so deep as to
render "projects" the prototypical undesirable land use for
middle-class Americans-of any race. The project becomes
much like the person to be avoided, as antithetical to the
self. This may explain some of the public's "Katrina fatigue"
despite popular exhortations in the storm's aftermath to
engage difficult subjects of race and class. 112 Yet it is the
institutional origins of these identifications in places like
New Orleans which should concern us here. Because they
represent a fundamental flaw in our social contract which
increasingly reveals the mythology of middle-class stability.

109. See id. at 1284.
110. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 6 (quoting the planning
historian Daphne Spain).
111. See LEWIS, supra note 22, at 133.

112. There is perhaps no better example of at least official disinterest in
continuing discussions of race, class, and Katrina than President Bush's
omission of any mention of the disaster in his State of the Union address
seventeen months after the storm.
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C. Ghettoizationand Antimarkets
Meanwhile, New Orleans became a case study in innercity American poverty. Scholars of poverty in the United
States recognize a distinction between poverty generally
and ghetto poverty. Poverty generally affects millions of
Americans for a variety of reasons and for different periods
of time. It may or may not be directly traceable to
structural factors in the economy or institutional practices,
such as racism. There are two important facts about
poverty generally in the United States: Most poor people
are white, and most of the white poor cannot be defined by
spatial characteristics. 1 13 Most white poor people live
among moderate-income and middle-income people rather
than in isolation and they typically share the local
resources and amenities of non-poor communities. In the
New Orleans metro area, only 11% of poor whites lived in
areas of concentrated poverty in 2000.114
Forty-three
115
percent of the black poor lived in such areas.
Ghetto poverty, on the other hand, is defined in racial,
economic, and spatial terms. Overwhelmingly, it describes
black and, to a lesser extent, Latino poverty. Ghetto poverty
is more clearly reflective of structural factors, such as race
116
discrimination in employment, segregation in housing,
117
and structural changes in employment and wages.
It is
geographically concentrated, increasingly isolated from the
113. See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND
THE AMERICAN CITY 66 (1997). In his exhaustive study, Jargowsky notes an
increase in concentrated white poverty between 1970 and 1990, but still
representing relatively small percentages of poor white people-from 2.9% to
6.3% (the same figures for blacks were 26.1% and 33.5%). Id. at 40-43.
Spatialization of poverty is also reflected in the racial concentration of high
poverty neighborhoods. Putting aside regional differences, whites comprised
just 22.5% of high poverty neighborhood residents in 1990 compared to 49.7%
for blacks and 24.3% for Latinos. Id. at 61-63. Whites in high poverty
neighborhoods tended to live in much smaller cities than blacks (though not
necessarily Latino groups). See id. at 65. White poverty is simply not spatially
comparable to black poverty in its character and concentrations. See id. at 6668. See further discussion infra at Part IV.
114. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 7.

115. Id.
116. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supranote 15, at 18-19.
117. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-50 (1987).
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non-poor, and can be measured in census tracts. Its
socioeconomic dynamics are traceable in institutional
patterns, such as educational performance, serious crime,
and involvement with the criminal justice system and
public welfare institutions. Invariably, ghetto poverty is a
phenomenon rooted in cities and is therefore the focus of
the poverty discussed here.
These definitions require one further step. I refer to
persistently poor, ghetto neighborhoods as "antimarkets."118
Antimarkets is a term of relation and posits that ghettos
must be viewed in geographic as well as socioeconomic and
historical comparison to the middle-income areas around
them. Antimarkets are measurable sites of economic and
political negation over time, where consumer infrastructures
fail to provide basic public and private goods and services to
community members, citizens are disproportionately
governed by public law systems that often regulate their
privacy, public health is secondary, educational systems are
reflective of scarce resources and chronically underperform,
and severe economic instability is common among
households. Moreover, antimarkets must always be viewed
relative to middle-income areas nearby, like a racial
counterfactual, since one is typically the anti-norm of the
other. For example, antimarkets enjoy few of localism's
protective zoning devices that support the needs of families
with school-age children.1 19 Transiency is common,
homeownership is tenuous, and participatory democracy is
rare. Everything costs more. 120 Drugs and joblessness are
the antecedents to a great many bad outcomes.121
Antimarkets are frequently despised by the residents of
middle-class communities who, ironically, often depend on
uses most
them to shoulder the burden of environmental
122
would not tolerate in their backyards.
118. Troutt, supranote 10, at 429.
119. See Dubin, supra note 17, at 740-41 (arguing that low-income black
communities have been historically denied the "protective zoning" devices that
supported economically stable neighborhoods).
120. See DAVID D. TROUrr, THE THIN RED LINE: How THE POOR STILL PAY
MORE (1993) (containing a study of consumer disparities between low- and
middle-income neighborhoods in Oakland and Los Angeles).
121. See WILSON, supra note 117, at 93-108.
122. New Orleans is a prime example of this. In general, the environmental
issues that affect the Gulf Coast region are very different from those affecting
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This contempt for the "Other" in antimarkets is both
reflexive and reflective, and comes about in part because
of the little acknowledged interdependency between
antimarkets and middle-class areas (called "metamarkets,"
in my earlier work). It is reflexive in its automatism-even
the sympathetic middle-class are quick to deny a connection
between the plight of the ghetto poor and our own status,
let alone responsibility. It is reflexive in the sense of the
the rest of the country. Cities like New Orleans are located near companies that
"manufacture a range of products including fertilizers, gasoline, paints, and
plastics . . . ." Manuel Pastor et al., In the Wake of the Storm: Environment,
Disaster, and Race After Katrina, 2006 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. 1, 3. The
proximity to such pollution-generating factories, and the fact that much of
Louisiana's drinking water comes from underground aquifers susceptible to
contamination from polluting industries, creates a general vulnerability to
environmental threats. However, much of New Orleans' vulnerability can also
be attributed to the "history of... white resistance [that] has affected both race
relations and the region's ecology." Id. Because the South has often been a "sort
of dump for the rest of the nation's toxic waste," states like Louisiana have
become a breeding ground for environmental hazards and such hazards tend to
disproportionately affect communities of color. Id.
For years, the government has encouraged the growth of the petrochemical
industry through "wartime federal investment .... [and] [t]ax exemptions for
plant construction and expansion .... ." Craig E. Colten, The Rusting of the
Chemical Corridor, 47 J. Soc'y HIST. OF TECH. 95, 96 (2005), available at
http://www.historyoftechnology.org/eTC/v47no1/colten.html. Additionally, "[t]he
Louisiana Stream Control Commission issued waste-discharge permits with few
questions asked during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly along the Mississippi,
where the commission turned down only one application between 1958 and
1966." Id. This encouragement resulted in continued expansions "which
included massive buyouts by large corporations ... to build large petrochemical
complexes," and eventually, the environmental effects could no longer go
unnoticed. Pastor et al., supra, at 29.
New Orleans was generally susceptible to environmental health hazards,
but certain groups were particularly vulnerable to the severe effects of the
storm. For example, "[n]inety-eight percent of the residents of the Lower Ninth
Ward, the lowest-lying area of New Orleans that was most vulnerable to
flooding, were African Americans." Id. at 19. Not only were residents in this
area severely impacted by flooding, but they were likely exposed for longer
periods of time, as this is the same population that was less likely to have
access to private transportation. See id. Such long periods of exposure to debris,
oil spills, mold, E. coli in the floodwaters, contaminated soil and sediments,
contaminated drinking water, and high concentrations of lead, arsenic, and
various carcinogens are likely to have devastating effects. See id. at 30. What
Katrina did was to reveal some of that environmental racism, as well as that
topographical inequity. Yet going forward, the revelation of such dangerous
conditions will put greater pressure on housing markets, allow for fewer safe
areas for development, present serious challenges to local density preferences,
and, therefore, may yield little patience for affordable housing.
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zero-sum interdependency localism has promoted. Middleclass resistance to the siting of affordable housing in its
neighborhoods, meaningful racial integration, the sharing
of environmental burdens necessary to the region's businesses
and residents, desegregated classrooms, common employment
centers, mass transit-all represent perfectly rational, yet
self-maximizing instincts, as we will see. However, the
interdependency should be clear: Where middle-class or
metamarket communities reject wealth and resourcesharing with less privileged people in order to maintain
"good ratables," the neighborhoods where less desirable
people can live-antimarkets-are concentrated with
unwanted uses, economically unstable households, and a
lack of legal controls protective of individual welfare; in
current parlance, "bad ratables" necessarily accumulate in
areas that are the negation of
"good ratables." The one
23
cannot exist without the other.1
By the time Hurricane Katrina struck, New Orleans
had created multiple antimarket neighborhoods. In 2000,
the city's overall poverty rate was 28%, only a couple of
percentage points higher than in 1970, but among the
highest in the nation. 124 Its homicide rate-along with high
levels of police corruption and brutality that coincided with
high rates of witness harassment to produce alarmingly low
rates of both felony conviction and incarceration-frequently
made it the murder capital of the country. 125 However, three
brief examples demonstrate the entrenchment of antimarket
characteristics before the storm: poverty concentration,
educational dysfunction, and the repudiation of public
housing on behalf of low-income households.
First, black poverty in the city concentrated over time
123. A similar kind of interdependency has come to characterize different
types of suburbs within a state, as well as more affluent suburbs and central
cities. See discussion infra Part IV.
124. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 6.

125. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter & Christopher Drew, Dysfunction Fuels Cycle
of Killing in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at Al (reporting on the
record murders since Katrina that once again make New Orleans the most
violent city in the country). Most of the crime is black-on-black, drug-related
killing in which suspects are rarely apprehended or charged. Id. Low arrest and
conviction rates are variously blamed on anti-snitching fears induced by
frequent retribution on witnesses who cooperate, lax judges, low-paid
prosecutors, and a long history of corrupt, abusive police practices in poor
neighborhoods. Id.
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into "extreme poverty tracts"-e.g., census tracts in which
at least 40% of the households had incomes below the
poverty line-mainly in parts of the city that were most at
risk in the event of a hurricane or flood. In 2000, 50,000
poor residents lived in forty-seven extreme poverty
tracts. 126 All of these were predominantly black. 127 By
contrast and extremes of inequality, wealthy neighborhoods
like the Garden District were 85% white.128 Unemployment
rates were also telling. The Lower Ninth Ward for example,
where 85% of the population was black, had a 14%
unemployment rate. 129 Overall, in neighborhoods where
90% of residents were black, the unemployment rate was
white
predominantly
In
sharp
contrast,
20%. 130
East,
and1
Read
Boulevard
like
Gentilly,
the
neighborhoods
5%.13
below
rates
unemployment
had
Quarter
the French
Furthermore, approximately 9% of white children under the
age of eighteen were living in poverty in the New Orleans
44% of black children under
metro area, compared to over
32
1
poverty.
in
living
eighteen
Second, the New Orleans public schools were so
abysmal that they went into state receivership in 2000, and
FBI offices were established on school grounds to root out
corruption.133 Public education suffered in southern
Louisiana, according to Peirce Lewis, partially as a result of
the variety of private schools developed first by Catholics
seeking parochial education and followed by wealthy
Protestants. 134 Like much of the South, New Orleans had
never seriously provided educational resources for blacks,
126. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 6.
127. See id.

128. Id. at 7-8.
129. JOHN R. LOGAN, THE IMPACT OF KATRINA: RACE AND CLASS IN STORMDAMAGED NEIGHBORHOODS 1 (2006), http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/ report.pdf.
130. Id.

131. Id.
132. Diversitydata.org, Metropolitan Quality of Life Data: Economic
Opportunities: Child Poverty Rate by Race/Ethnicity, http://diversitydata.
sph.harvard.eduprofiles.jsp?ma=5560 (compiling data from the 2000 U.S.
census).
133. See Adam Nossiter, Plan Shifts Power to New Orleans Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at A12; see also LEWIS, supra note 22, at 131.
134. LEWIS, supra note 22, at 99.
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which re-organized in the white flight after Brown and
contributed to high rates of illiteracy among black parents
and a general lack of experience with formal learning
among older generations. 135 The city's poor public
educational system is frequently mentioned as a factor in
its competitiveness relative to rival cities in the region and
36
throughout the South. 1
Finally, the failures of public housing in New Orleans
have been the target of reform efforts which respond in
theory to agency mismanagement issues and necessary
mixed-income development, but in practice risk eliminating
affordable housing options for the city's poor. In the face of
widespread evidence of corruption and ineffectiveness, the
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) assumed supervision over HANO in 2001.137 HUD
has tried to advance poverty de-concentration policies
through HOPE IV mixed-use developments. The problem is
that, like many such initiatives across the country,
demolition has far outpaced the construction of affordable
new housing, and former public housing tenants are
displaced to an inadequate market of housing vouchers.
Demolition of the St. Thomas housing project in 2000 is
a fitting example. Built in 1941, St. Thomas contained
1,500 units on 64 acres of prime land in the uptown
neighborhood. 138
HUD
and
HANO
permitted
a
135. See id. at 130.
136. See id. at 131. Lewis further notes that the growing presence of black
school children in Jefferson Parish has triggered white flight from the public
schools. Id. at 131 n.14. Black children outnumbered white in 1999-2000. Id. As
Jefferson becomes more like older suburbs nationally, some believe that St.
Tammany Parish is at risk of a similar decline. Id.
137. See Gwen Filosa, Ejected Public Housing Residents Return to C.J.
Peete; Homecoming Lacks Utilities, Permission, NEW ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE, Feb. 11, 2007, at B1.

138. See LEWIS, supra note 22, at 134-36; see also Coliseum Square Ass'n v.
Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 215 (5th Cir. 2006) (describing a brief history of the St.
Thomas project). The court in Coliseum Square Ass'n described the project as
such:
By 1994, St. Thomas had become excessively run-down and crimeridden. The Housing Authority of New Orleans initiated renewal
efforts, which resulted in a plan to renovate the area covered by St.
Thomas. In 1996, HUD granted the Housing Authority of New Orleans
$25 million through the HOPE IV program for revitalizing St. Thomas
.... Because of its grant of federal funds, HUD became responsible for

1140

BUFFALO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 55

redevelopment project on the site that would consist of a
total of 1,142 units, most of them luxury condos and
139
market-rate apartments, with only 337 low-income units.
Further, the applicable zoning ordinance was amended 140
to
allow for the addition of a "big box" retailer-Wal-Mart.
The proposed project galvanized opposition from local
community groups representing tenants as well as smart
growth advocates and preservationists critical of the land
use decisionmaking process. Litigation ensued, but the
project was built.14 1 The fears of gentrification and
displacement among former public housing tenants were
ensuring that its financing of the revitalization project complies with
the requirements of NEPA and NHPA. In 1998, HANO enlisted a
private developer . . . to assist in

improving the plan .

.

.

. By

September 2000, HUD completed the initial Section 106 review
required by the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA") ....
Subsequently, the Housing Authority of New Orleans, the State
Historical Preservation Officer, and the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation (a federal agency) signed a Memorandum of Agreement
("MOA') for the project. Demolition began in October 2000 .... On
September 4, 2001, after HRI publicly announced that Wal-Mart would
be filling the retail space, the State Historic Preservation Officer asked
to reopen the NHPA review .... [Ilnvestigation included consultation
with . . . the City of New Orleans and its planning commission, the

State of Louisiana, the general public (including St. Thomas residents),
and the project's opponents (including neighborhood groups and
preservation agencies).
Id. at 226. In July of 2002 the plaintiffs, on behalf of the citizens of New
Orleans, seeking to compel HUD to withhold funding for the project and
arguing HUD did not comply with the National project, did not comply with
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the NHPA. Id. at 227.
Plaintiffs also argued that certain zoning changes negatively impacted the
environment, and that the project was only in compliance with the local zoning
ordinance after the change in the local zoning laws. Id. But the court held that
proving there was a change in the zoning laws was insufficient proof of the
project's alleged significant impact on the human environment. Id. at 233. The
court also struck down plaintiffs' argument that the project imposed an unfair
and highly controversial tax increase on the residents. Id. at 233-34.
139. See LEWIS, supra note 22, at 135.
140. See Interview with William Borah, New Orleans land use lawyer, in
New Orleans, La. (Dec. 12, 2006).
141. See Coliseum Square Ass'n, 465 F.3d at 250 (adhering to the strict
standard that required plaintiffs, which in this case were community
organizations representing the citizens of New Orleans, to show HUD acted
"arbitrarily" or "capriciously" and showing that the court was very deferential to
HUD's determinations and in reviewing HUD's consideration of environmental
justice issues, finding there was "no administrative insensitivity to racial or
economic inequality").
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confirmed, and the experience fomented deep distrust for
HUD and future HOPE IV projects in New Orleans.
Since the storm, a number of factors, including the slow
pace of recovery, have converged to prevent large numbers
of the city's poorest residents from returning, HUD has
sought a wholesale elimination of many New Orleans
142
housing projects in favor of mixed-income development,
and a wave of decentralization is affecting public143education
and there is a movement toward charter schools.
D. Cumulative Fault Lines Revealed: HurricaneKatrina
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, de jure
segregation-the system of racially identified spacecoalesced with formal land use planning to institutionalize
de facto segregation in the city and suburbs of New Orleans,
notwithstanding some of the most considerable early antisegregation forces in the nation's history. Although the
actual geographic fault lines changed over time, the basic
color scheme did not. Race-neutral land use regulation
reproduced the patterns of racial inequality that slavery,
Jim Crow, and segregation inscribed. To the present, whites
in the New Orleans metropolitan area have enjoyed
unrestricted access to, and economic opportunities arising
from, appreciating markets of higher, less polluted lands.
For poor blacks in public housing or increasingly concentrated
low-ground antimarket neighborhoods, life became routinely
more isolated from the political mainstream, viable
neighborhood institutions, economic opportunity, 144and
stability. It also became significantly more dangerous.
142. See Deborah Cotton, From the Ground Up: Housing Residents Take
Their Protest to the French Quarter, KATRINA HELP CENTER, July 6, 2006,
http://www.thebeehive.org/Templates/HurricaneKatrina/Level3NoFrills.aspx?P
ageld=l.5369.6532.8587; see also Anderson v. Jackson, No. 06-3298, 2007 WL
458232 at *1 (E.D. La. 2007); Richard Wolf, Some New Orleans Housing May
Reopen, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/200612-19-katrina-housing-x.htm.
143. See, e.g., Michael Tisserand, Education Politics Flood New Orleans:As
the City Struggles to Rebuild, the Debate over Charter Schools Heats Up, UTNE
READER, Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 10.
144. See BRIAN L. LEVY, BAYOU BLUES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF A
DISASTER-A CASE STUDY OF HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (2006), http://www.uga.edu/

juro/2006/levy.pdf. This Hurricane Katrina case study
environmental racism-classism and residential segregation

examines

how
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All of this became fatally apparent on August 29, 2005,
when Katrina, a category four hurricane, devastated the
city and its compromised system of levees and canals,
producing flooding that killed over 1,800 people, destroyed
200,000 homes, and inundated almost 80% of Orleans
Parish. 145 Despite the wide swath of destruction and the
inevitability that a great many, moderate- and middleincome Orleanians would be affected, Hurricane Katrina's
force fell disproportionately on the city's huge population of
very poor people. 146 Their lack of resources-as well as their
overwhelmingly dark skins-was on international display
for several excruciating days of the aftermath, as they
waited in and outside the city's convention center and
Superdome for rescue by armed national guard. In most
cases, one single aspect of their vulnerability made them
visible: They lacked access to a car. Beyond that, many
lacked the capacity to stay in hotels or to travel by public
transportation to friends or families elsewhere. In their
race, class status, and addresses, they represented for a city
and a nation the unimagined devastation to which people
with limited social capital 147 are routinely vulnerable.

produce a greater disaster risk for poor, black Americans .... Disasters

offer a unique realm of analysis for environmental racism-classism
because . . . [they] enable analysis of how individuals are housed in
areas with a pre-existing risk. Race is found to be a strong predictor of
flood damage, while class is found to be unrelated .... These results, if
accurate, undermine the notion of a race-class nexus for production of
harms.
Id.
145. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 12.

146. See id. at 17.
147. By a lack of social capital, I refer to the condition of being
undereducated, physically and socially separated from valuable land and from
vital economic and information relationships, lacking the leverage of political
organization, poor, connected to the state mostly through compelled
relationships with public institutions, and often at chronic risk of poor health.
'[Slocial capital' refers to features of social organization, such as networks,
norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual
benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and
human capital." Robert D. Putnam, The ProsperousCommunity. Social Capitaland
Public Life, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 21, 1993, availableat http://xroads.virginia.edul
-hyper/DETOC/assoc/13putn.html; see also Leonardo Vazquez, A Plan For
Democratic and Equitable PlanningIn New Orleans, PLANETIZEN, Nov. 7, 2005,

http://www.planetizen.com/node/17769 ("Social capital is the network of ties
that people have with one another. It is what makes it possible for people to
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The relationship between race and poverty associated
with the worst of Katrina's damage brought rare visibility
to the country's social landscape. Eighty percent of the
households living in flooded areas of the parish were
black; 148 the average annual income of those households
was $38,000, compared to $55,000 in non-flooded areas. 149
The rate of homeownership in the flooded areas was 53%though some affected areas, such as the Lower Ninth Ward,
had even higher rates-compared to 69% in non-flooded
areas. 150 However, renters, whose losses and voices were
hardly discussed in most public conversations about
rebuilding or participation in planning, accounted for more
than 50% of those who were displaced. 15 ' The gaping
proportion of renters is not merely a constant among
persistently poor populations-they tend to have low rates
of homeownership. It is also a reflection of the large
numbers of public housing residents who were displaced by
the storm, every one of which was black. 152 Those projects,
we have seen, were primarily located in extreme poverty
neighborhoods-i.e., census tracts in which at least 40% of
the households have below-poverty incomes. In 2000, New
Orleans had forty-seven extreme poverty census tracts, and
Hurricane Katrina inundated thirty-eight of them. 153
These statistics depict structurally engrained economic
marginalization, which follows from the legal, historical,
and economic antecedents described in the context of
slavery, Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and legal segregation.
However, the sedimentation of inequality could not have
occurred without physical, racial, and economic distance, as
well as the legal support to sustain it. Localism, as I argue
work together to achieve social change. The social capital effort would focus on
neighborhood quality of life. As residents engage in planning for their own
neighborhoods, they will be better prepared to think about the future growth of
their city. Also, by phasing in growth, the city can better provide services to
residents and businesses. This will help attract more people to the city.").
148. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 15.
149. Id.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 16; see also Dewan, supra note 11.

152. See The Brookings Institution, Key Indicatorsof Entrenched Poverty, in
METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM 2005 (compiling U.S. Census
Bureau and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development data).
BROOKINGS

153. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 5, 17.
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in the next Part, provided the jurisprudential edifice that
succeeded
formal
segregation. Together
with the
ghettoizing array of discriminatory policies promulgated by
the federal government, innumerable private actors, and
transformations in the labor economy, the obvious problems
presented by Hurricane Katrina-the
problems of
persistent, concentrated urban poverty-have grown much
bigger than most cities can overcome on their own. 154
Nothing can effectively overcome the marginalizing effects
of segregation and suburban sprawl without the
participation of those same predominantly white middleclass communities in the metropolitan area. Like a great
many parts of the country, middle-class households in New
Orleans' surrounding parishes have benefited economically
from their distance from the poor, particularly blacks.
However, there is mounting evidence that those benefits are
ephemeral and-because of the environmental and qualityof-life costs they entail-limited, especially for those in
older suburbs.
This Article will conclude with some specific ideas
about local government reform under a principle of what I
call equitable regionalism. However, the description of the
process of Americanization and segregation in Parts I and
II is now followed in Part IV by an analysis of how
segregation gave rise to legal localism, a set of facially
neutral doctrines grounded in city police powers but suited
to suburban localities. It is the resonance of localism with
courts and increasingly important suburban political
constituencies that supplants de jure racial segregation.

154. Though it is a discussion worthy of a companion article, there is a great
deal more that the city and parish of New Orleans could do on behalf of its
poorest citizens, and it should. Beyond the many social capital and in-place
community building strategies that have shown promise in other places, this
analysis argues that a more equitable use of regional planning tools is a
condition of sustained social and economic development outcomes. However, as
I argue in Part IV, infra, a precondition of effective equitable regionalism is
public participation in comprehensive planning among city residents.
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IV. RESEGREGATION, THE SUPREME COURT, LEGAL LOCALISM,
AND RESISTANCE AGAINST INTEREST

A. Resegregationand the Creation of Legal Localism
If the begrudging rejection of racial segregation
represented an affirmation of the principles of equality and
pluralist democracy articulated by the founders in the late
eighteenth century and argued by radical Creoles of color in
the late nineteenth century, how could racial segregation
persist in a different guise through the twentieth century?
Why would the development of suburbia have to necessitate
such a destructive shift in the ability of cities like New
Orleans to sustain middle-class norms and outcomes for so
many of their residents? To be sure, the answers to these
questions span several disciplines and social and economic
phenomena. However, I argue in this Part that local
government law has played a key structural role in
fashioning a more durable system of racial and economic
inequality than de jure racial discrimination could.
Beginning with the power to zone-and, in many regions of
the country, to prevent annexation-local governmentscreatures of state power-were given the autonomy
necessary to an exclusive existence outside of the large
cities from which most of their more residents originally
came. Emanating from race-neutral principles of rational
planning and home rule, the network of rules governing the
powers of suburban municipalities were developed and
reinforced by the courts in ways that defined a lenient role
for the state in interlocal conflicts and asserted state power
over localities only occasionally and within narrow notions
of shared regional responsibilities. The result is legal
localism, the norm of local governmental rules today, which
closely corresponds to the more general cultural idea of
localism, which characterizes a spectrum of impulses and
attitudes about territorial control of community in the
United States. Much of this formation has been covered by
other scholars, particularly Richard Briffault and Sheryll
Cashin. 155 Some of it bears review here in the service of a
different analytical emphasis: the connection to preserving
racial segregation and perpetuating its corresponding
155. See supra note 17.
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economic advantages and disadvantages that fall mainly,
but not exclusively, along racial lines. With respect to racial
segregation and concentrated poverty, localism has been
characterized in a facilitative, rather than a causal, light. It
is time localism-legal and cultural-be recognized as the
primary agency behind resegregation, without which it
would neither have been accommodated nor sustained.
Legal localism defines the relevant localities it governs
in a subtle hierarchy, with suburbs first and citiesespecially larger, urban centers-second. 156 This structural
tilt represents two foundational aspects of suburban
development. First, they were made in opposition to certain
aspects of city life as a refuge for the wealthy away from the
indignities of the largely immigrant poor and the
uncouth. 157 Suburbs were originally designed to sustain an
exclusive quality of life. As they opened up after World War
II, they were further designed to create an exclusive quality
of life for the emergent middle-class. Second, they must be
conservative legally and socially in order to preserve status
quo stability against the invasion of destabilizing forces. 158
Suburban legal power is sometimes a tool, but more often a
shield used to defend against outsiders. 159 Local control
must mean the power to exclude even more than the power
to include; indeed, the attractiveness to employers and
residents with high incomes and few public needs-i.e., its
capacity to include-has always been premised on the
success of a locality's efforts to exclude.160
B. The Burger Court and Localism's Jurisprudential
Edifice
The character and function of localism took lasting
shape under the sanction of courts precisely during the
156. See Briffault, Our Localism II, supra note 17, at 373-74; Williams,
supra note 17, at 119 n.190 ("Note that the Supreme Court, like Jefferson
himself, has not used the Jeffersonian rhetoric of local control to argue for local
control of cities.").
157. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 150-51 (1985).
158. See Briffault, Our Localism I, supra note 17, at 70-71.
159. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism II, supra note 17, at 355 ("The core of
local legal autonomy is defensive and preservative .... ").
160. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 1993.
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peak period of white flight from cities, the federal passage
of civil rights laws aimed at frustrating formal segregation,
and intense battles over school busing. Although most legal
localism had been developed by state courts, several important
Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the way local autonomy
would be balanced against the constitutional arguments
advanced by both nineteenth and twentieth century civil
rights advocates. More importantly, the five cases discussed
here-Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,i 6i Warth v. Seldin,i 62
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,1 63 San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 64 and Milliken v. Bradleyi65-put the
Court's invaluable imprimatur on the critical aspects of
local autonomy. 66 Specifically, they solidified the power to
exclude outsiders through zoning ordinances and other land
use devices even where such localized decisions clearly and
negatively affected regional housing markets, affirmed the
sanctity of jurisdictional borders within which local powers
are exercised, and defended localities' presumptive power
not only to retain local control of education but of school
finances, even if doing so produced gross fiscal disparities
among municipalities. Surprisingly, legal scholars have
paid too little attention to the significance of these cases
decided in the 1970s, the decade that saw not only the
suburban resettlement of white middle-class urban dwellers
but also the beginnings of significant economic decline in
the nation's largest cities. 167 Without them, the twin pillars
of local autonomy-land use and school finance-would not

161. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
162. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
163. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
164. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
165. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

166. Arbitrarily limiting consideration to the 1970s, there were others from
the Burger Court. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668
(1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). But see Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
167. But see Williams, supra note 17, at 111-13. Williams looked at many of
the same Burger Court cases analyzed here and found a strong Jeffersonian
notion underlying the decisions' sometimes contradictory support for local
sovereignty, especially in upholding exclusionary zoning and local control over
schools. Id.
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in8 the jurisprudential edifice succeeding
have been secure 16
racial segregation.
In Belle Terre, the Court resolved a dispute brought by
college students in favor of the town and its right under the
police power to zone areas exclusively for families of related
persons. Race was not directly at issue in the case and, had
it been, the Court indicated the ordinance could not survive
constitutional scrutiny. 169 Instead, the homeowner and
renters believed the village's ordinance infringed on their
constitutional rights to travel and privacy. 170 In affirming
the broad police powers of the suburban locality in the case,
17
the Court referred to precedent from large cities. '
However, in its assumptions about the need for such
expansive power and the ends to which it would likely be
put, Belle Terre is clearly a suburban case. Despite the
ostensibly locality-neutral language of Douglas's opinion,
the city of New York-the closest large city to the Long
Island suburb of Belle Terre-could not have exercised
168. This analysis differs from an earlier one in which I explore the specific
reproduction of middle-class ideals in Supreme Court opinions of that era.
Troutt, supra note 10. The analyses are complementary since both go to the
formation of an armored suburbia and the Courts' methods of sanction.
However, the analysis here demonstrates how these opinions form a bulwark of
legal localism, which could supplant formal segregation.
169. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6 (1974) ("If the ordinance
segregated one area only for one race, it would immediately be suspect under
the reasoning of Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, where the Court invalidated
a city ordinance barring a black from acquiring real property in a white
residential area by reason of an 1866 Act of Congress, 14 Stat. 27, now 42
U.S.C. § 1982, and an 1870 Act, § 17, 16 Stat. 144, now 42 U.S.C. § 1981, both
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 245 U.S., at 78-82."). The issue had
begun to receive some attention from legal commentators, too. See generally
Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Wiley E. Mayne,
Jr., Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident
Indigents, 23 STAN. L. REV. 774 (1971).
170. Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 7.
171. For such a situation, see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), an
urban slum removal case from Washington, D.C., in which the Court stated:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Id. at 33.
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power in that way. Like most major cities, it was, and is, too
large, too heterogeneous in people and types of neighborhoods,
and has too many kinds of already permissible uses and
lifestyles to impose such restrictions. 172 Further, the Court's
language locates the (idealized) environment the Village
was trying to maintain well outside the "city":
The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like
present urban problems. More people occupy a given space; more
cars rather continuously pass by; more cars are parked; noise
travels with crowds.
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
The
addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one ....
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people.173

By pitting the Village's regulation against "urban
problems," the Court situated the localist power to exclude
certain types of residents within the suburbs. The decision,
therefore, belongs among those that establish legal localism
on behalf of suburbs in direct reference to the excluded uses
and users common to larger cities. But a racial subtext is
also clear. The power to exclude categories of uses
associated with urban problems unfortunately remains code
for black people to this day. It is an enormous power, made
greater by its capacity to preclude strict scrutiny, and
of
allows the proliferation of racial proxies under the guise
174
rational planning and community self-determination.
172. Briffault points out that timing also prevents cities from engaging in
such regulation in that their spatial and demographic diversity developed well
before the rise of localist legal principles in defining a municipality's police
powers. Briffault, Our Localism II, supra note 17, at 373-74. Zoning protects
parochial interests against future incursions. Id.
173. Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.

174. Justice Douglas's rather famous quote could be modified with the
benefit of hindsight to read, "a sanctuary for [white] people." Id. at 9.
Interestingly, this outcome was explicitly rejected by the Court's greatest
champion of civil rights, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and utterly ignored by
Justice Brennan, both of whom dissented in Belle Terre.
This is not a case where the Court is being asked to nullify a
township's sincere efforts to maintain its residential character by
preventing the operation of rooming houses, fraternity houses, or other
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In another zoning case, Warth v. Seldin, plaintiffs were
fair housing advocates-individuals and organizations
representing the affordable housing interests of Rochester,
New York's low- and moderate-income tenants-challenging
neighboring Penfield's zoning ordinance for excluding
175
people from living in the town on the basis of class status.
Again, race was not directly in dispute. Plaintiffs'
constitutional claims were dismissed by the district court
and the Second Circuit on standing grounds, and the Supreme
Court affirmed. 176 The result demonstrates a less obvious
dimension of localism's conservative power. Not only were
the claims based on economic discrimination rejected, but
the dismissal on standing grounds worked the legal
procedural equivalent of the zoning ordinance's purpose: It
defined and excluded outsiders and denied any regional
responsibility a suburb might have for their housing needs.
Specifically, the Court found that nonresidents were
entitled to no say in the regional effects, or negative
externalities, associated with one town's efforts to bar the
entry of others. Plaintiffs had argued, for instance, that
Penfield's exclusions necessarily affected the distribution of
affordable housing opportunities across the relevant
metropolitan area, devaluing the city of Rochester's housing
market and burdening its tax base. 177 The majority found
these arguments wholly speculative as to causation, and, in
sharply dismissive language, considered any economic
impact on neighboring localities
merely "incidental adverse
178
effects" of the regulation.
commercial or high-density residental [sic] uses. Unquestionably, a
town is free to restrict such uses. Moreover, as a general proposition, I
see no constitutional infirmity in a town's limiting the density of use in
residential areas by zoning regulations which do not discriminate on
the basis of constitutionally suspect criteria.
Id. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. The ordinance maintained 98% of the town for single-family detached
residences only. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 490, 495 (1975).
176. See id. at 493.
177. See id. at 493, 496.
178. Id. at 509. Quoting precedent, the majority began by saying:
'Of course, pleadings must be something more than an ingenious
academic exercise in the conceivable.' We think the complaint of the
taxpayer-petitioners is little more than such an exercise. Apart from
the conjectural nature of the asserted injury, the line of causation
between Penfield's actions and such injury is not apparent from the
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In contrast, Arlington Heights actually was a land use
case in which race was directly an issue in dispute. There, a
low-income housing development corporation was denied a
variance which would have allowed it to build a complex of
affordable apartments in a suburb outside of Chicago.
Hearings were held in which opponents of the rezoning
made mixed objections, some based on the "social issue,"
most based on an expected drop in property values. 179 The
Village rested its denial on grounds of zoning integrity,
given the single-family character of the area, and the
expectations of resident homeowners. 80 Plaintiffs sued
under the then-existing discriminatory effects standard of
the Fair Housing Act, 18 ' but lost before the Court. Using the
intent standard it had just announced in Washington v.
Davis, 82 the Court acknowledged that minorities might be
disproportionately affected by the lack of affordable housing
in Arlington Heights, but that the decision to deny the
rezoning request
was based on racially neutral land use
83
principles.
complaint. Whatever may occur in Penfield, the injury complained ofincreases in taxation-results only from decisions made by the
appropriate Rochester authorities, who are not parties to this case.
Id. at 509 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)). But see, e.g., NAACP v. City of Kyle, No.
A-05-CA-979, 2006 WL 1751767, at *1, 5 (W.D. Tex. June 16, 2006) (explaining
that the NAACP, the Home Builders Association of Greater Austin, Inc. (HBA),
and National Association of Home Builders, Inc. (NAHB), brought a claim after
the City of Kyle adopted changes to its zoning ordinances). In NAACP, the
plaintiffs argued that the changes, which required a minimum garage size, an
increase in the minimum home size, and an increase in the minimum lot size,
would cause the average price of a single family residence to increase by about
$38,000. Id. at *1. This increase would thus have a disparate impact on African
Americans and Hispanics and would "have a segregative effect on the
community." Id. The Court held the disparate impact on minority communities
was a viable injury. Id. at *5. The Court also held that such injury could be
traced to the zoning ordinances because generally, "more stringent zoning and
subdivision ordinances . . . cause[ I the price of entry level homes to increase
and that .

.

. price increase has .

.

. a disproportionate negative effect on the

ability of minorities to purchase starter homes in the City's jurisdiction." Id.
179. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
257 (1977).
180. See id. at 258.
181. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
182. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
183. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270-71.
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Arlington Heights is important to localism in
demonstrating (1) its interaction with contemporary race
discrimination standards, namely specific intent; and (2)
the relative immunity enjoyed by land use decisions with
segregative effects so long as a rational planning rationale
is also apparent. The decision was a test case for both sides
of the suburban housing integration conflict. Plaintiffs
discovered the tremendous difficulty in mounting a frontal
assault on policies with clear racially-and economicallysegregative effects. Defendant-suburban municipalities
learned how insulated their land use decisionmaking could
be from constitutional attack so long as a paradigm of
categorical land uses-first articulated in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realtyl 8 4-was scrupulously followed. These
three land use cases provided a localist manual for
excluding lower-income residents and black people
generally. Joan Williams has argued that, as a
jurisprudential matter, the Burger Court's political values
followed a Jeffersonian model of local sovereignty and a
hostility toward cities that fit within the demographic
conflicts of the era:

184. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For instance, Euclid's language with respect to the
"parasitic" effect of apartment houses resonates today.
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that
the development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the
coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in
destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such
sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.
Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others,
interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the
smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the
disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the
occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger
portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving
children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by
those in more favored localities-until, finally, the residential
character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of
detached residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances,
apartment houses, which in a different environment would be not only
entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to being
nuisances.
Id. at 394-95.
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By 1970, the intertwined issues of racial and economic
discrimination had become closely linked with the fight between
city and suburb. As cities became poorer and blacker, and suburbs
became richer and whiter, housing and school discrimination
issues took on a city/suburb dynamic in many metropolitan areas.
The Court has used the principle of local autonomy to refuse relief
for discrimination in housing or schools whenever such relief
requires changes in a city's basic metropolitan structure. The
Court's local sovereignty principle enabled it to eviscerate
fourteenth amendment equal protection requirements in the large
number of cases in which discrimination in housing or schools
cannot be remedied without alteration of local boundaries or local
185
duties.

Two school cases affirmed localism as the nearly
exclusive locus of control over educating children within
sacrosanct municipal boundaries.
In Rodriguez, the Court confronted a direct federal
equal protection challenge to the way the majority of states
allowed local control of school funding. Plaintiffs were a
class of Mexican-American parents from tax-poor, urban
school districts in Texas, challenging the state's method of
school finance on the ground that its reliance on locally
collected property taxes beyond a baseline of uniform state
funding worked substantial disparities between propertyrich and property-poor districts. 8 6 The wide differences in
per-pupil expenditures helped to support smaller class
87
sizes, higher teacher pay, and more experienced teaching.
The district court had ruled in plaintiffs' favor, finding that
education was a fundamental right under the Constitution,
wealth was a suspect classification, and any governmental
scheme which discriminated in public education on
88
economic grounds was therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
The Court reversed on each holding, finding no
fundamental right to education, denying that wealth was
suspect, and upholding the importance of local autonomy
over school finance on rational basis grounds. 8 9 Mindful of
185. Williams, supra note 17, at 118 (footnotes omitted); see also Briffault,
Our Localism I, supra note 17, at 30-31, 37-38.
186. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1973).
187. See id. at 14 n.35.
188. See id. at 17-18.
189. See id. at 18.
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the federalism concerns implicated in the plaintiffs'
challenge, 190 the majority characterized the trial evidence
as involving murky issues of social and economic policy
outside the Court's expertise and producing only an
allowable and expected amount of fiscal inequality. 191
Despite the necessary emphasis on state power relative
to federally guaranteed rights, Rodriguez is squarely a
localism decision in its substance and its narrative of local
power. The majority dismissed the fiscal inequality between
rich and poor districts as a hybrid or compromise between
local fiscal control and irreproachable state-wide minimum
standards. Instead, the disparities reflected differences in
ingenuity and democratic priorities between localities,
primarily matters of choice yielding competitive diversity.
As Justice Powell stated:
[L]ocal control means... the freedom to devote more money to the
education of one's children. Equally important, however, is the
opportunity it offers for participation in the decisionmaking
spent.
process that determines how those local tax dollars will be
19 2
Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs.

The argument fully ignored the relative incapacity of
tax-poor districts to exercise such fiscal choices on behalf of
their school children, and that, as Justice Marshall pointed
out in a stinging sixty-seven-page dissent, the inequality of
fiscal resources resulted in denial of an equal opportunity to
learn. 193 These concerns, according to the majority's
190. See id. at 44 ("[lIt would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater
potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we
are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education presently in
existence in virtually every State.").
191. See id. at 50-51.
192. Id. at 49-50.
193. Id. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court, he argued, ignored its
own education precedent when, in the desegregation context, it had ruled that
unequal resources for black law students amounted to a denial of equal
protection notwithstanding a baseline of law school curricula. See id. (citing
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950)). Justice Marshall's voluminous
dissent suggests disagreement among the justices so bitter as to imply genuine
animus as to the meaning of the case. For example, Marshall asserts that the
majority violated basic rules of appellate procedure by allowing the appellants
to argue against facts that had gone unchallenged at trial for the first time at
oral argument before the Court. See id. at 95 n.56. Further, he argued that the
majority's indifference to fiscal disparities was blind to the line-up of wealthy
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narrative were irrelevant to both local control and equal
protection in the school finance context. The Court even
foreshadowed the competition for "good ratables" that
dictate so many local governmental decisions to this day:
Nor is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level of
taxable wealth within any district may result from any number of
events, some of which local residents can and do influence. For
instance, commercial and industrial enterprises may be
encouraged 194
to locate within a district by various actions-public
and private.

If the blueprint for sprawl and fiscal zoning was not
already known to suburban communities across the United
States by then, it now bore the Supreme Court's seal.
Finally, Milliken v. Bradley affirmed the primacy of
local control over education policy in rejecting an
interdistrict remedy for Detroit's clear record of racial
segregation in its schools. Like Warth, Milliken is one of the
few to directly comprehend the regional scope of
institutional racism. The district court found that, given
residential patterns at the time, no intradistrict remedy
could achieve desegregated schools within the city and,
because any attempt would probably further identify
particular schools-i.e., code them-as majority black, it
would hasten more white flight to the suburban
periphery. 195 As a practical matter, only a regional or
metropolitan remedy would work.
The majority, per Chief Justice Burger, disagreed,
concerned less about the probability that serious
constitutional violations would go without a meaningful
remedy than with the administrative uncertainty caused by
crossing admittedly arbitrary boundaries. 196 Yet the
narrative of Milliken is not as emphatic about local control
school districts who filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of Texas. See id. at 85 &
n.42.
194. Id. at 54.
195. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738-39 (1974). Specifically, the trial

judge wrote that 'while [they] would provide a racial mix more in keeping with
the Black-White proportions of the student population [they] would accentuate
the racial identifiability of the [Detroit] district as a Black school system and
would not accomplish desegregation."' Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner, Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (No. 73-434)).
196. See id. at 741-42.
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as its legacy suggests. 197 Instead, it is more meaningful as a
pronouncement about community and responsibility, which
resonates to this day. After all, Detroit was not always so
black; its white population had been streaming out of the
city for years up to and beyond 1970, when Milliken was
first brought. 198 Local control of predominantly white school
districts in the suburbs outside of Detroit defined and
defended a sense of community for its residents. Many of
them had fled Detroit and, therefore, rejected membership
in that community. In doing so, those communities and
their school districts could not be asked to assume any of
the responsibility for the segregative policies leading up to
that point in the Detroit schools nor for the effects of such
demographic shifts. 199 What mattered from a somewhat
formalist constitutional perspective was that those
demographic shifts ended up in nearly all-white districts
which did not and could not have engaged in segregation.
An interdistrict remedy would force them to accept blame
for Detroit's past practices, casting serious doubt on the
sanctity of jurisdictional borders. 200 In this sense, the
197. The oft-quoted language is the following: "No single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools;
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of
community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the
educational process." Id.
198. See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS:
RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 209-29 (1996). Detroit, like New

Orleans, has a history as one of the most segregated cities in the United States.
See id. app. A, at 273.
199. Joan Williams makes a related point about community in the context of
the Burger Court land use decisions such as Belle Terre.
The Court's use of Jeffersonian rhetoric serves to blur the underlying
issue of how to define the "community" entitled to self-determination.
Of the
myriad possible
"communities" available-from
the
neighborhood to the nation-the Court chose to focus its solicitude
upon predominantly white, relatively affluent suburbs that were
opposing the introduction of low- and moderate-income housing or
other "undesirable" uses.
Williams, supra note 17, at 112.
200. The use of economic proxies for racial struggles is relevant in another
important respect here: it obscured the extent to which affluent whites
benefited from localist rules far more than middle- and lower middle-class
whites. The latter could be vociferous antibusing segregationists in part because
they were the whites whose lives were altered by desegregation orders.
However, in Charlotte, North Carolina, where "busing equalization" took hold
across the metropolitan area, a coalition of whites and blacks worked
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majority's arguments are familiar to many discussions of
legal remedies for past racial discrimination--colorblindness.
The Court's willingness to use colorblindness to trump even
local control continues in its most recent school desegregation
decisions. 201 Regionalism, especially equitable regionalism,
as I later discuss, often risks provoking defensive reactions
about blame for discriminatory conditions.
The doctrines of legal localism illustrated by the
previous sample of cases were of critical utility in
institutionalizing a variety of transitions occurring around
the middle of the past century. On the one hand, the fatal
contradictions of de jure segregation and the separate-butequal doctrine had been exposed to the world after World
War II and was jurisprudentially untenable. Here, Brown
must be seen against the larger context of federal
legislative changes, a burgeoning civil rights movement,
20 2
and, for many whites, unwelcome cultural confrontations.
Cities embodied much of the impetus for flight. On the
other hand, the suburbs and a strong economy were
expanding along with the role of the federal government in
providing the financial and infrastructural means to a
middle-class ideal for returning veterans. That the benefits
of national policy would accrue on a racially discriminatory
basis did not, for residents of recipient communities, pose a
challenge to their validity. Instead, the changing landscape
successfully to spread the effects of school desegregation across classes.
According to Matthew Lassiter: "The Charlotte case reveals that the long-term
viability of urban school systems undergoing court-ordered desegregation
depended upon spatial and socioeconomic remedies that encompassed the entire
metropolitan region and pursued racial stability through policies sensitive to
the demands of class fairness." Matthew Lassiter, "Socioeconomic Integration"
in the Suburbs: From Reactionary Populism to Class Fairness in Metropolitan
Charlotte, in THE NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY 120, 140 (Kevin M. Kruse & Thomas

J. Sugrue eds., 2006).
201. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05908 slip op. at 1-2, 11-17 (U.S. June 28, 2007). In Parents Involved, the Court
struck down two voluntary school assignment plans in Seattle, Washington and
Jefferson County, Kentucky on the grounds that their binary classification
schemes sought racial balance in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and
the non-racial desegregation dictates of the Brown case. Id. at 11-17. Although
the school districts' explicit use of race in making assignment decisions
compelled heightened scrutiny, the plurality gave little deference suggested by
earlier cases to the educational policy decisions made by elected local school
officials acting on behalf of the affected local communities. Id.
202. This was especially true for Southern whites. See SOKOL, supra note 13,
at 6-8.
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promoted a twentieth century notion of rugged individualism
20 3
and the welcome political moderation of colorblindness.
Yet the powers of local autonomy that made suburbs safe
havens from the city, the poor, and blacks were always
characterized by defensiveness. They were in many ways
untried powers, not on behalf of the very affluent, but for
the middle-class, blue-collar ascendants to suburbia who
were somewhat unaccustomed to wielding exclusionary
controls. By the 1970s, as we have seen, the controls were
tested by myriad legal attacks. They held. From these
decisions, a jurisprudential edifice was erected that would
define insiders from outsiders, draw economic meaning
from jurisdictional lines, empower suburbs against the
cities from which they came, and limit their responsibilities
even to their regional neighbors. For the first time, none of
this occurred on the basis of race. Neutral rules then
interacted with markets and quickly increased the value of
exclusions. Suburbia's footing has not been questioned
since.
Most importantly, the creation of legal localism
effectuated a paradigmatic alteration of race relationships
by substituting economic proxies for race which could
withstand constitutional challenge. Localism is, therefore, a
post-war instrument of economic segregation, and economic
segregation is nearly always a post-civil rights proxy for
racial segregation. Today, the doctrines that give mechanical
support to these proxies are settled law. Very little in more
contemporary jurisprudence refutes these principles despite
evidence that a great many communities that may have
exercised local autonomy for the paramount purpose of
maintaining segregation indeed-three decades latersucceeded. The same appears to be true of attitudes.
Expectations have settled. As the analysis in the next
section shows, the conjoining of legal localism and localist
attitudes around the economic right to exclude reflects the
203. Matthew Lassiter describes these sentiments within the terms Richard
M. Nixon used to great effect with voters he called the "Silent Majority":
The ascendance of color-blind ideology in the metropolitan South, as in
the rest of the nation, depended upon the establishment of structural
mechanisms of exclusion that did not require individual racism by
suburban beneficiaries in order to sustain white class privilege and
maintain barriers of disadvantage facing urban minority communities.
LASSITER, supra note 12, at 4.
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mindset of privatization. Like private clubs with unfettered
rights to make their own rules and determine their own
membership, the sovereignty of local governments to ignore
nonresidents-at least where economic membership is
concerned-goes mostly unquestioned. 2 4 Unfortunately,
this idea of sovereignty, without more, facilitates continued
segregation. Thus, having explored the creation of legal
localism, the analysis turns next to localism as the
successor instrument to the philosophy of segregation in its
current residential forms.
C. Legal Localism as the Instrumental Successor to
Segregation Today
It is important to acknowledge two corresponding
trends since localism was institutionalized. First, segregationby race and class-is arguably as pronounced today as it
was when whites began fleeing post-Brown desegregation
orders, though some areas have seen some decrease. For
example, the New Orleans metropolitan area ranked as the
fourteenth most segregated region in 2000, with a
dissimilarity index of sixty-nine (over sixty is considered
high); that was the same rate in 1990, and only three points
below the index for the New Orleans metro area in 1980.205
Relatedly, the isolation index for New Orleans metro area
blacks, which measures the extent to which blacks live in
census tracts with only other blacks, ranks seventh highest
in the nation and has gone roughly unchanged between
1980 and 2000 at about 70%.206 In general, segregation
207 remains highest where black populations are greatest
204. Briffault makes a similar observation in Briffault, Our Localism II,
supra note 17, at 373 n.122.
205. LEWIS MUMFORD CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN AND REG'L RESEARCH,
supra note 14, at 7.
206. Id. at 9.
207. The report from the Lewis Mumford Center explains:
Black-white segregation remains very high except in the metropolitan
areas with the smallest black populations. Over twenty years,
segregation declined by more than 12 points in metro areas with less
than 5% black population, and by nearly 10 points in areas that are 1020% black. But in those areas with 20% or more blacks, the decline was
only half that (about 6 points). The total black population of this latter
set of metro areas (20% or more black) is nearly 15 million, about half
the national total. This means that the African American population in
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among the larger central cities in the country 20 8-which
also means that the nation's black population is
disproportionately concentrated in209areas with high indices
of racial segregation and isolation.
Second, the growth of suburban municipalities under
localism is tangible evidence of an "American Dream" for
what is now a majority of Americans deemed middle-class.
The overall economic success of a municipal form based on
increasingly valuable homeownership and environmental
support for family stability cannot be taken lightly. Not all
disdain for large city life or attraction to suburban living
reflects structural racism. 210 Interwoven markets responding
to common consumer preferences produced a model of
sustainable household wealth that is largely efficient,
consistent with democratic beliefs, and economically
durable. 21' Locally responsive land use regulation and
education policies have tangible empowerment effects while
also protecting residential communities from dangerous
uses and adverse public health risks. 212 It is also a rational
system, based largely on equality of opportunity rather
than overt prejudice, which has produced substantial social
the United States is about equally divided between regions where there
has been moderate progress since 1980 and regions where progress is
very slender.
Id. at 4.
208. The dissimilarity index for Detroit (eighty-five), New York (eighty-two),
Chicago (eighty-one), Newark (eighty), Miami (seventy-four), Philadelphia
(seventy-two), and Los Angeles (sixty-eight) shows how large population centers
are ranked among the twenty most segregated in 2000. Id. at 7.
209. Id. at 11. Blacks are not significantly moving away from segregated
areas either. "In 1980 a majority (53.9%) lived in metro areas where segregation
was 75 or above. Those same metro areas still held 51.9% of African Americans
in 1990, and 50.6% in 2000. Thus there was very little net shift away from these
highly segregated areas." Id.; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 15, at 8182.
210. See generally JACKSON, supra note 157, at 73-86 (discussing the
cultural attraction to suburbs historically).
211. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 2 (1995).
212. Indeed, it is this function of "protective zoning" that some have argued
is missing in low-income urban neighborhoods, also disproportionately
populated by families with school-age children, yet subject to incompatible uses
that undermine consumer infrastructures of basic goods and services,
discourage economic investment, and increase poor health outcomes. See Dubin,
supra note 17, at 757-73; Troutt, supra note 10 at 496-504.
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and economic benefits for people of myriad racial and ethnic
backgrounds. 213 That the legal edifice on which it stands,
localism, systematically justified a constitutive economic
segregation of the black poor, and whose dynamics are
complicit in the steady decline of most major American
cities, has not damned it to its beneficiaries. As the titles of
Richard Briffault's exhaustive analyses suggest, Our
Localism,214 it is us. It reflects us, consumes us, and,
reflexively, we consume it in a self-sustaining cycle.
Nevertheless, these findings beg two normative questions:
Why should specific commitments to segregation-as only
one possible model of exclusion-continue to run so deep in
legal localism? And why should a system capable of producing
so many wealth-enhancing opportunities remain committed
to reproducing the kind of staggering inequality witnessed
in New Orleans? Several reasons reveal themselves: economic
rationalism,
decentralization,
consumption,
political
fragmentation, and black middle-class preferences against
racial integration.
First, economic segregation appears rational under a
system that discriminates on the objective basis of land use
categories, wealth maximization considerations, and parental
preferences about child welfare rather than immutable
characteristics like race. As the history of land use and
occupancy within the city of New Orleans shows, racial
segregation had always commodified land occupancy
according to status categories, for instance, making poorly
drained, hazardous areas less valuable to whites and home
to blacks. Over time, patterns developed there and in cities
across the country where racially and economically
disfavored areas became one and the same. The template
for a proxy was well established by the time whites left the
city-increasingly a racially identified space-for the
suburbs where the capital structure of development-i.e.,

213. See, e.g., OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 211, at 136-47 (discussing
specific housing factors in wealth acquisition by race as well factors
contributing to racial disparities in home ownership rates, such as interest rate
differentials by race); NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA
2006 16-17 (2006) (chronicling home ownership rates). However, racial
disparities will only increase as a result of the current crisis in subprime loans
which disproportionately affect black homeowners.
214. Briffault, Our Localism I, supra note 15; Briffault, Our Localism II,
supra note 15.
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the system of government-financed private mortgage
lending, insurance, infrastructure development, highways,
etc.-could ultimately reduce preferences into something as
quantifiable and efficient as a test score: property values.
By most measures, economic segregation is theoretically
good for property values. Thus, patterns originating clearly
along racial rules eventually developed into markets after
those rules were rejected, a transition the Supreme Court,
and many state courts, sanctioned under legal localism.
Today, this conclusion is intrinsic to an economic
analysis of localism. For instance, in a recent book William
Fischel propounds a political thesis around the centrality of
property values:
The homevoter hypothesis holds that homeowners, who are the
most numerous and politically influential group within most
localities, are guided by their concern for the value of their homes
to make political decisions that are more efficient than those that
would be made at a higher level of government. Homeowners ...
balance the benefits of local policies against the costs when the
policies affect the value of their home .... 215

Furthermore, the history of sprawl tells us that most
middle-class homeowners-and their real estate brokers,
lenders, and insurers-have traditionally devalued blackness
on sight. And it may never be true that accepting lowincome people into a community is "efficient," given the
near unanimous association between them and declining
property values, higher taxes for public services, crime, and
underperforming schools. The point is that economic
rationalism supplanted racism as a critical first step in
sustaining segregation under law.
If spatial separations between people, however unequal,
are rationally and legally justified, the resource imbalance
created by those relationships will fulfill certain instrumental
cultural prophecies. The first is that, in the absence of overt
racial discrimination in housing, education, and employment,
something must be inherently wrong with the segregated
poor. Their alarming statistical demise in educational
performance, incarceration rates, unemployment, out-of215. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE

POLICIES 4 (2001).
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wedlock births, welfare recipiency, etc., was confirmation of
inadequacies. On the other hand, in the absence of overt
racism or privilege taking, something must be inherently
right about the separated middle-class. 216 Its prosperity
became emblematic of unequaled American power in the
world, especially after the Cold War ended. This is, of
course, a crude contemporary version of the binary
capitulation described earlier as the first step toward New
Orleans' Americanization. Yet it is a necessary sociological
complement to the political and legal developments that
created and sustained economic segregation as a fit successor
to segregation. When the resource disparities on either side
of the binary are compared, it is the basis for self-fulfilling
prophecies about the dangerous nature of an undeserving
black poor and the pluck and justifiable well-being of a
largely white middle-class.
A second reason for localism's succession is
decentralization, another train that could not be stopped.
As more localities developed further beyond urban boundary
lines and, resisting annexation, 217 began consolidating their
legally protected identities, decentralized government
meant localist government. This political fragmentation is
in part a measure of sprawl, but it demonstrates the appeal
of local autonomy to define who belongs and what goes
inside its borders. With population decliiing in central
cities, local governments proliferated. 218 Rusk uses the
example of the nation's original 168 metropolitan areas: In
1950, 60% of the residents of these areas were governed by
216. As some commentators
attitudes about race:

have recently described post-civil rights

had nothing to do with racism
and everything to do with the failure of the racial other to take full
advantage of the unlimited opportunities that were available to all.
Whites who benefited from these structures were not privileged, but
innocent people who had earned what they had acquired and, unlike
racial minorities, were deserving of national respect.
John A. Powell et al., Towards a Transformative View of Race: The Crisis and
The persistence of racial disparities ...

Opportunity of Hurricane Katrina, in THERE Is No SUCH THING AS A NATIONAL
DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND HURRICANE KATRINA 59, 66 (Chester Hartman &

Gregory D. Squires eds., 2006).
217. This development was crucial to local government power. See DAVID
RUSK, INSIDE GAME OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN

AMERICA 9 (1999); Briffault, Our Localism I, supra note 17, at 77.
218. RUSK, supra note 217, at 66-67.
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just 193 city councils, commissions, and mayors or city
managers. 219 Forty years later, the proportion shifted
dramatically: 70% of the metro area residents were under
the governance of 9,600 suburban municipalities, towns,
villages, townships, and counties. 220 No doubt some of this
sprawl represents people moving from one suburb to
another-usually from older to newer-in a pattern of
leapfrogging mobility that has long characterized patterns
of suburbanization. 221 Indeed, that pattern illustrates the
emerging truth about suburbs: they are far from monolithic
or equal. Increasingly, as discussed in the next Part, the
inner-ring or older suburbs, like Jefferson Parish adjacent
to Orleans Parish, have been penetrated by black and other
residents of color. Many of these suburban cities are in
economic decline and have become disfavored by many
middle-class homeowners. When those who can move to
newer localities do so, racial segregation tends to increase.
In this manner, decentralization both reflects and facilitates
segregation by encouraging flight. That is, localism222makes
it rational, while decentralization makes it possible.
This leads to a third reason for localism's succession:
consumption. The emphasis on property values showed the
extent to which housing choices are commodified.
Decentralization revealed the popular proliferation of those
choices in further patterns of segregation. Consumption
embodies the idea that the package of a locality's goods and
services-e.g., the quality of its schools, the value of its
homes, the amount of its taxes, the appeal of its
amenities-has become the primary means by which
middle-class people choose where to live. Like Tiebout's
consumer-voter, 223 they shop. Stark racial animus may not
play a conscious role in their thinking, although there is

219. Id.

220. Id. at 67.
221. See MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 2 (1997); Richard Briffault, The Local Government
Boundary Problem in MetropolitanAreas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 115, 1135-36 (1996);

Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 2003 n.99.
222. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 1993.
223. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 417-24 (1956) (theorizing the compulsion dynamic of preferences
among middle-class "consumer-voters").
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strong evidence that it still might. 224 Instead, the objective
economic categories contained within land use schemes and
reflected in real estate marketing subsume segregation.
Segregation is simply one of the characteristics of housing
commodities in middle-class housing markets. Concealed as
an aspect of the market, it becomes the norm and often goes
unchallenged. 225 As modes of consumption increasingly
condition participation in society, segregation risks
becoming, like square footage, an unremarkable aspect of
residential value-or worse, it is presumed.
A fourth reason for localism's succession is the role of
politics in promoting racial and economic distancefragmentation-between communities of voters whose
interests might otherwise be shared. Decentralization
creates a political framework for parochialism. Political
interests are easily narrowed. 226 From an interlocal
perspective, the demands of localism require that
municipalities act defensively against incursions as well as
against each other. Interlocal cooperation is often difficult
under this arrangement unless dividing lines are clear.
Economic segregation, especially as a proxy for race, is just
such a line. Thus, Republicans successfully exploited class
and race antagonisms following the legislative achievements
of the civil rights movement and pitted the political
interests of working- and lower middle-class whites against
poor black recipients of welfare. 227 Affirmative action has
also served as such a bright-line political wedge issue,
encompassing racial and economic fears among white
voters. In any event, decentralized governance may
224. See, e.g., RUSK, supra note 217, at 318-24 (discussing evidence of white
racist attitudes on housing choice).
225. See

David

Dante

Troutt,

Ghettoes

Revisited:

Antimarkets,

Consumption, and Empowerment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 19-24 (2000). For many

people in the U.S. housing market, finding economically and/or racially
integrated communities is increasingly difficult. See generally NAT'L FAIR HOuS.
ALLIANCE, UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY-PERPETUATING HOUSING SEGREGATION IN
AMERICA: 2006 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT (2006), http://www.national

fairhousing.org/resources/newsArchive/resource_24256802754560627686.pdf.
226. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 2027-33.
227. See, e.g., LASSITER, supra note 12, at 17 (arguing that historical
misconceptions about Richard Nixon's "Southern Strategy" ignore the
persuasiveness of appeals to a "silent majority" of suburban whites whose
themes would appeal to suburban voters for decades); ORFIELD, supra note 221,
at 35-36 (describing political alignments in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area)..
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preclude opportunities for local coalition-building among
groups who are routinely separated from each other and are
accustomed to viewing their interests as at odds. According
to Cashin's analysis, these are the isolation effects of a
segregated political culture228fueled by localism, which breeds
its own cohesive strength.
Finally, the analysis so far has implicitly assumed the
opposition of white middle-class suburbanites, the primary
consumers of segregation, to living in racially integrated
communities. However, the degree of resegregation today
would almost certainly require the cooperation of middleclass black people, at least so far as suburban racial
integration is concerned. Conventionally, we assume the
interplay of two factors in residential segregation: zoning
exclusions and lack of economic means among blacks. But
zoning is not always a factor in racial segregation,
especially in many southern areas where urban planning
regulations are less entrenched. Economic disparities are
not uniformly overwhelming. Something else is happening.
The unscientific answer lies in some form of pervasive
discomfort, if not hostility, among black middle-class people
toward integration. That is, without the same formal
barriers to black middle-class mobility as in decades past,
preferences for segregation may be cooperating forces. The
New Orleans scenario suggests a reason: Middle-class
sacrifice-exactly what is not
blacks are less willing to 229
clear-for racial integration.
228. Sheryll Cashin analyzes these tendencies in the context of parochialism
and institutionalization. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 201523. Parochialism results from homogenous political identities based narrowly on
boundary lines, which blind voters from natural allies beyond them. See id. at
2015. The more identity is connected to boundaries, the easier it is for voters to
choose their allies. See id. The more homogeneity is chosen, the stronger and
more cohesive those communities' exercise of local power. See id. at 2018-19.
Localism, therefore, breeds its own strength, in part because it fosters
homogeneity as a uniting political interest against outsiders. See id. This
dynamic contributes to regular "mobilizations of bias," id. at 2022, a feature of
what I call localism generally. Institutionalization, in Cashin's terms, describes
the normalization of those parochial attitudes into the political status quo. Id.
229. These middle-class blacks have enclaves in older suburbs, such as
Jefferson Parish or the subdivisions of New Orleans East, instead.
Unfortunately, these areas were devastated by Hurricane Katrina. See
discussion supra, at 1130-31. For a stimulating discussion of the dimensions of
black middle-class suburbanization and the various costs associated with living
in or outside predominantly white areas, see generally Sheryll D. Cashin,
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D. What is Lost: Resistance Against Middle-Class Interest
As the durable successor to segregation, localism has
produced unprecedented wealth and community stability
for millions of affluent and middle-income American
households. Yet the racial proxy on which it standsproduces stunning
economic segregation-necessarily
inequalities. Persistent ghetto poverty among blacks
concentrated in resource-abandoned hulks of once-great
cities has preconditioned incalculable social instability and
diminished economic opportunities for generations of
households. In the disastrous aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, New Orleans' historical march toward this feature
of Americanization proved fatal, ruinous, and shameful.
The tragedy of New Orleans demonstrates the urgent need
for equitable reform of legal localism on behalf of the
persistently poor and the cities in which they struggle.
Localism's exclusions have obvious spillover effects, but
none greater than the costs to cities and their residents.
However, those costs do not remain entirely within the
city and its residents, particularly when federal assistance
to states for programs like affordable housing development,
health care, and income assistance decrease and state
taxpayers must make up the difference. A growing body of
research is showing that the costs of localism-especially on
the middle-class-are even more direct than that.
Specifically, the land-grab of suburban sprawl represents a
costly waste of natural resources and environmental
damage. 230 Cross-border effects may represent a combination
Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration:A Post-Integrationist
Vision for MetropolitanAmerica, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729 (2001).
230. As one scholar explained:

Suburban sprawl is fueled by the "iron triangle" of finance, land use
planning, and transportation service delivery. Sprawl-fueled growth is
widening the gap between the "haves" and "have-nots." Suburban
sprawl has clear social and environmental effects. The social effects of
suburban sprawl include concentration of urban core poverty, closed
opportunity, limited mobility, economic disinvestment, social isolation,
and urban/suburban disparities that closely mirror racial inequities.
The environmental effects of suburban sprawl include urban
infrastructure decline, increased energy consumption, automobile
dependency, threats to public health and the environment, including
air pollution, flooding, and climate change, and threats to farm land
and wildlife habitat. Many jobs have shifted to the suburbs and
communities where public transportation is inadequate or nonexistent.
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of neighbor-to-neighbor externalities or the aggregation of
localist policies pursued by municipalities engaged in
necessary competition. 231 The leapfrogging of consumer
investment into "favored quarters 232 leaves behind more
and more moderate- and middle-income suburban dwellers
with increased taxes for fewer services. 233 In many
metropolitan areas around the country, cities as well as
older suburbs represent the "have-nots" of state finance,
which subsidize the lower taxes and infrastructural
improvements of the "haves." The structural inequality
inherent in localism has reached past the urban periphery.
As Myron Orfield explains:
An area with high social needs and low resources is generally not a
nice place to live, with poor services and high taxes. Conversely,
an area with high resources and low social needs is a nice place to
live, with good services and low taxes. This process of polarization
fuels itself as high-income individuals with broad residential
choices and businesses seek out pleasant places, good services, and
low taxes and avoid unpleasant places, poor services and high
taxes. As the favored quarter captures more and more high-income
The exodus of low-skilled jobs to the suburbs disproportionately affects
central-city residents, particularly people of color, who often face more
limited choice of housing location and transportation in growing areas.
Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the United
States, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1201 (2004). The biggest problem is that

"the decision of who lives where, particularly given entrenched housing
segregation, is not simply driven by choice." Pastor et. al., supra note 122, at 8.
In his case study of Hurricane Katrina, Brian L. Levy discusses the concept of
"environmental racism," and suggests residential segregation is responsible for
it. LEVY, supra note 144. He outlines "place stratification," the concept that
certain places are more desirable to live in than others, as "[a]n important
factor of residential inequality." Id. He also highlights the significant role
certain "institutional mechanisms" play in allowing the dominant group to
retain control over the more desirable areas. Id. Some of these mechanisms
include: redlining, exclusionary zoning, and the strategic placement of
affordable housing units. See id. Thus, the only way to ensure equitable
development is to recognize the harm caused by these exclusionary mechanisms
and plan preventatively. See id.
231. See Briffault, supra note 221, at 1133.

232. See supra note 221 and accompanying text; see also ORFIELD, supra
note 221, at 5-7 (discussing Robert Charles Lessor and Company's real estate
consultant Christopher Leinberger's use of the term to describe exclusive areas
of high services, low taxes, and multiple barriers to housing affordable enough
to support the many low-wage workers needed for their job base).
233. See, e.g., Ken Belson, In Success of "Smart Growth," New Jersey Town
Feels Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at Bi.
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residents, its base increases, taxes go down, and/or services
improve. It becomes an even more attractive area. But as
individuals and businesses leave areas with high social need and
high taxes, the base shrinks and tax rates go up. The incentive to
2 34
get out grows.

Perhaps the greatest detriment of all is economic:
Metropolitan areas that continue to embrace localism at the
expense of shared regional responsibilities tend to be less
competitive in attracting economic development, keeping
businesses and jobs, and maintaining a deep and talented
labor pool. 235 At a certain point, of course, constant flight
and leapfrogging may reflect market preferences, but this
feature of localism-and the legal and political deference to
it-permits self-interested, irrational, and inefficient
preferences to flourish at the expense of regions, cities, and
impoverished minority communities within them. 236
Meanwhile, we increasingly live our lives in non-local
terms, since most of what we do by necessity crosses
jurisdictional lines. We often work in different towns or
cities than we live, shop in regional malls and store
locations, eat and attend cultural events throughout the
metropolitan area, and seek friendships and recreation
across the region. As a nation, we now tend to sleep locally
but live and work regionally. The anomaly is that the
myriad regional relationships that make up our actual lives
are governed by a contradicting web of local jurisdictional
powers. 237 Our tools of democratic decisionmaking, like our
laws, take little account of regional realities.
The foregoing suggests that some form of regional
234. ORFIELD, supra note 221, at 9. The most unstable suburbs are older,
working-class localities without a dynamic tax base, even more less stable than
central cities. See id. at 31. They are more easily overwhelmed by economic
decline than central cities, because the latter are better equipped institutionally
and have more diverse resources. See id.
235. See generally MANUEL PASTOR JR. ET AL., REGIONS THAT WORK (2000).
See also Briffault, supra note 221, at 1139-41. "[I]nterlocal competition,
interlocal wealth disparities, and the resulting inferior services and
infrastructure in central cities can bring down the economic base of the region
as a whole, making affluent areas as well as poorer ones less well-off than they
might have been had the region as a whole invested more in poorer localities."
Id. at 1140.

236. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 2012-13.
237. See Briffault, supra note 221, at 1142-43.
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governance may be closer to what we want than localism. In
theory, regional governance of planning issues critical to
the maintenance of middle-class concerns should not be
politically hard to sell. Pervasive frustration with the daily
effects of sprawl link with traditional middle-class voter
concerns about the environment, traffic, and preservation of
natural resources. 238 As a result, urban growth boundaries
should be more prevalent than they are. 23 9 Where issues
clearly transcend local control and create waste, solutions
are expensive and require the fair allocation of tax burdens.
Hence tax base sharing should be more prevalent than it
is.240 Notwithstanding the incomplete state of the evidence,
arguments in favor of some form of regional governance
appear to support the best interests of a middle-class
public.
Of course, if this were true, we would have much more
of it. Instead, we have, in places like New Orleans and
surrounding other major U.S. cities, an often inefficient,
selectively democratic, inequality-producing legal norm of
localism. Briffault argues that a major reason localism
remains entrenched in places where it is counterproductive
is the political power and discretion it provides local elites:
[T]he resistance to regionalism in the political process is largely a
matter of the self-interest of those who benefit from the status quo,
such as local elected officials, land developers, corporations that
are the subjects of interlocal bidding, and the businesses and
residents located in the high-tax base localities of the metropolitan
24 1
area.

This is undoubtedly true of many older citiesincluding New Orleans-but the criticism, I argue,
illustrates a problem with even the best legal commentary
on localism: It fails to emphasize sufficiently legal localism's
succession as the instrument of post-war de facto
238. See RUSK, supra note 217, at 331-32; Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest,
supra note 17, at 2013.

239. See, e.g., RUSK, supra note 214, at 159-61 (discussing the process by
which Portland, Oregon's growth boundaries were established). But see
Briffault, Our Localism I, supra note 17, at 46 (arguing against urban growth
boundaries as having exclusionary effects in tightening housing markets).
240. See RUSK, supra note 217, at 329; see also discussion infra Part V.A.
241. Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 27

(2000) (footnotes omitted).
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segregation. The demographic and economic events before,
during, and after Hurricane Katrina in the New Orleans
metro region help reveal localism's irrational side. The
resistance to regionalism inherently reflects structural
racism and anti-urbanism at a time when such a political
commitment militates against the economic interests of
many of its proponents. I agree with Briffault, Cashin, and
others about the principal remedy: regional governance.
The version I espouse can be called equitable regionalism,
with emphasis on local comprehensive planning with the
force of law as a necessary precondition. A discussion of the
principle follows in Part V.
V. A GENERAL BLUEPRINT FOR EQUITABLE REGIONALISM
A. Equitable Regionalism
In the foregoing analyses, I have attempted to
demonstrate from an urbanist perspective how the reentrenchment of racial and economic segregation was
facilitated by this country's legal and ideological
commitment to localism. I have done so primarily through
the example of metropolitan New Orleans-before and after
Hurricane Katrina-an area whose original exceptionalism
might have been a model for a racially divided nation but
whose capitulation to racially and politically distinct
geography produced a horrendous spectacle of dislocation,
economic ruin, psychological devastation, and death. Given
the scope of the underlying pattern in cities and the specific
harms to New Orleans, it is difficult to propose a workable
remedy in this same analysis. What I hope to add, however,
is further support for regionalism as both an idea and a set
of law reform-oriented commitments.
Antisegregation efforts have not typically focused on
regionalism with the same intensity that, for example,
smart growth scholarship has. Nor has planning been a
central focus of urban legal scholars. I suggest that the
preceding analysis compels a focus on both regionalism and
planning as a means to dismantling the structure of
residential segregation. Mindful that any state-level
prescriptions are subject to vast differences in state political
organization, I propose a remedial principle called equitable
regionalism, which can be applied differently in different
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states. As the definition which follows indicates, equitable
regionalism is aimed at reducing structural inequities that
are routinely the product of localism. Therefore, this Part
illustrates the principle in the context of two important
areas affecting community
composition and fiscal
imbalances: sharing the distribution of affordable housing
and sharing tax revenues fairly across relevant regions.
These examples are also consistent with an emphasis on a
planning approach, which, I have argued, offers a way out
of localism's segregative effects without rejecting its core
tenets. The Article concludes with some observations about
how best to integrate equitable regionalism with
neighborhood planning, particularly in inner cities where it
has been lacking.
1. Definition and Components. Most forms of
regionalism recognize that many issues affecting localities
within a state are not susceptible to remedies by individual
municipalities, but must require interlocal cooperation at
the behest, usually, of the state. Sprawl, water and sewer
access, transportation, environmental regulation, and even
economic development are examples of issues for regional
governance in one form or another. Equitable regionalism
recognizes that issues with distinct equity implications
should be susceptible to regional cooperation because they
are typically the subject of localist opposition. Affordable
and public housing, revenue sharing, and density controls
are examples of issues for equitable regionalism. Yet
equitable regionalism also responds to the condition of large
cities in metropolitan areas as well as to older suburbs
where poverty has concentrated among blacks and other
minorities and which have lost a significant tax base to
more affluent suburbs. Those cities, like New Orleans, are
often in a fiscal free fall, particularly with respect to
schools, social services, and housing assistance for their
persistently poor residents, and their internal efforts to
improve the health, housing, education, income, and safety
concerns residents are rarely adequate. Given the
ideological resistance to racial and economic integration
that inheres in localism's rules, equitable regionalism
probably has to be imposed by the state legislatively, in
ways that explicitly benefit middle-income residents, too,
but through significant reallocation of the costs and
burdens associated with poverty. However, this type of
regionalism should produce more than efficiency gains from
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cost-spreading. Among the myriad benefits associated with
greater equity across regions are the increased "life
chances" or social capital-economic productivity and lower
public services costs-of all state residents. Poverty, we
have seen, is expensive. Its costs, duration, and prevalence
can be greatly reduced by a commitment to regional equity.
Therefore, equitable regionalism is a principle of local
government law reform by which states enact legislation to
compel interlocal cooperation where equity, and often
efficiency, demand it. Its goal is a more even distribution of
state resources across municipal populations, the
transformation of marginal areas into more integrated
communities and the reduction of significant disparities in
the provision of public and private services among
localities. It is constructive of efficient regional growth, and
destructive of localism's tendencies toward racial segregation
and poverty concentration. Although I discuss only two
issues here-affordable housing and tax revenue sharingequitable regionalism is also concerned with school finance,
efficient public infrastructure, improving the reach of public
transportation, environmental preservation and the just
allocation of environmental burdens and hazards, creating
optimal residential densities, and reducing sprawl. Some of
these issue areas have been the province of local planning
authority with wasteful and inequitable results. Equitable
regionalism, therefore, would diminish local control of
matters with clear regional implications and manifest
externalities. The principle may take many forms, from topdown to bottom-up, voluntary and compulsory, population
cut-offs--or locality size-for participation requirements,
commission-driven, and/or legislative. A region like the
New Orleans metropolitan area is better served by a topdown, compulsory state legislation requiring parishes
within the region to provide for some portion of these
components, through their planning regulation with elected
regional commission authority over compliance.
However, because the principle of equitable regionalism
originates with the need to share the burdens of major
cities and poorer suburbs with their better-off regional
neighbors, it must realistically account for some of the
missing advantages of suburban localism. One of those is
higher levels of political participation. Low-income urban
neighborhoods are generally places of low voter turn-out,
weak organizational structures, and limited opportunities
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for resident democratic participation. Many commentators
recognize the critical role of participation in building stable
communities; Rodolphe Desdunes and the radical Creoles of
color had long ago argued for the preservation of those
rights as a condition of equal citizenship. 242 Planning, I
argue in the next section, is the appropriate vehicle for
greater democratic stakeholdership from the standpoint of
equitable regionalism. But planning and local sovereignty
are not the same thing. The latter is a feature of localism
that is dependent on jurisdictional boundaries. For that
reason, the planning precondition I propose within the
principle of equitable regionalism is based on neighborhood
units, not municipalities.
2. Rationales. The principle of equitable regionalism is
premised on several rationales, two of them equitable, two
economic, and the last ones on political pragmatism. First,
both racial and economic justice are seminal concerns in the
political fabric of the nation. The struggle for civil rights
never fully progressed to a movement for economic equity,
in part because of the legal impediments denying
fundamental economic rights. However, the country's
shame, embarrassment, and individual generosity after
Hurricane Katrina suggests that, while this interest has
never been strong, it is not negligible. Coupled with the
empirically obvious overlap between class and race in New
Orleans, the twin rationales urge recognition of equitable
regionalism.
Another equity rationale is remedying the fiscal
disparities associated with so-called "favored quarters."
Where unequal state bargaining power creates fiscal
imbalances by which major cities and less-favored, but
older, suburbs wind up subsidizing expensive infrastructural
extensions to newer, wealthier, and exclusive suburbs,
regional revenue balance mechanisms should be triggered. 243
Equitable regionalism would encourage the kind of fiscal
transparency that would limit inequitable interlocal
subsidization by subjecting to more public scrutiny the
formulas for allocation of state infrastructure expenditures.
242. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
243. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 1988 (displaying
that Cashin's empirical support for these assertions is unparalleled); see also
Briffault, Our Localism II, supra note 17, at 380-81.
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In this way, the principle may help erode antimajoritarian
tendencies in state fiscal policy.
Economically, equitable regionalism is necessary to
diminish the negative externalities arising from increased
interlocal interdependency, and to acknowledge that
24 4
interdependency in formal and mutually beneficial ways.
The leapfrogging phenomenon by which residents either
leave older suburbs or enter an area's newer suburbs
encourages the wasteful passing on of burdens, as do school
closures and wasteful duplication of public services in new
population centers after old ones decline. 245 Moreover, many
public goods transcend local boundaries, putting certain
localities in a better position than others to provide them.
Efficiency, therefore, demands regional cooperation. A related
economic rationale is the greater regional competitiveness
that often comes with cooperative planning. 246 As tax and
poverty rates decline, the area becomes more attractive to
businesses and other institutions.
This diversity of economic rationales, provided they are
supported by particular regional facts on the ground, should
allow for more frequent political alliances across municipal
boundaries. As Orfield counsels, the political challenge of
regionalism in any form is to show middle- and lower
middle-class voters in suburbs with low and declining
property tax values that their interests converge with
central cities, that tax base sharing will improve their
services while lowering their taxes, that it will restrict their
fair housing commitments to regional standards, and that
it
247
will stabilize their communities against further decline.
B. Legislative Priorities
The country's largest cities have been sapped of their
fiscal capacity to grow and provide the social capital inputs
needed by concentrated, low-income households deliberately
244. For more on interdependency among regional actors, see Briffault,
supra note 221, at 1137-39.
245. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 2003 n.99.
246. See generally PASTOR ET AL., supra note 235.
247. ORFIELD, supra note 221, at 37. "On the merits, these middle-income,
blue collar suburbs are the largest prospective winners in regional reform." Id.
at 13.
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left behind by generations of suburban localism's legally
protected policies of segregation. The continuing crisis in
New Orleans is tragic evidence of a resource imbalance that
can produce fatal effects. That illustrative metropolitan
failure argues for regionalist reform-specifically, equitable
regionalism-by which state power is engaged to mandate
inter-local cooperation around, at a minimum, the issues
that localism consistently rejects at the expense of a
widening array of a state's working- and middle-class
communities. Next, I examine two such issues at the core of
the equitable regionalism principle-fair sharing of
affordable housing and greater proportionality in the
allocation of increased tax revenues-to show how these
priorities may work in practice.
1. Sharing Affordable Housing. Nothing is more
expensive to cities, or more corrosive of social capital
development, than racially concentrated poverty, a
socioeconomic condition produced by massive suburban
resistance to housing designated for even moderate-income
households. Given the history of local resistance, municipalities
must be compelled to provide real opportunities for
affordable housing development which explicitly seek racial
248
as well as economic balance across metropolitan areas.
There are a number of compulsory means, including
or without strong market
inclusionary zoning 249-with
mechanisms-state legislative regional housing formulassometimes within planning requirements-and housing

248. A great many experiments in regional fair share housing fail because of
municipalities' efforts to fill affordable units with the elderly, recently divorced
white women, and college students. While these demographic groups have real
needs for affordable housing opportunities in stable communities, favoring them
over harder-to-house low-income black and Latino families systematically
compounds the problem fair share planning is meant to alleviate.
249. See Angela Glover Blackwell, Equitable Gulf Coast Renewal: Creating
Housing Opportunity Through Inclusionary Zoning, POLICY LINK, at 2-4.
(providing a brief discussion on inclusionary zoning, and arguing that
"inclusionary zoning is an essential policy strategy to avoid the re-concentration
of poverty in New Orleans and ensure the fair distribution of affordable housing
across the city and surrounding region"). Blackwell points to existing patterns
of income and racial segregation, provides statistics about New Orleans prior to
Katrina, and concludes inclusionary zoning is "an important tool to guide more
balanced and equitable housing development patterns in New Orleans." Id. at 4.
See generally JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 6.7, at 244-47 (2003).
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incentive programs-carrot or stick approaches. The key,
however, is to fashion mandatory rules that preclude
competitive rule breaking at the local level or steady
evisceration through loop holes or non-enforcement. This
may entail the creation of regional oversight bodies, whose
members are both elected and appointed, and charged with
ensuring fair compliance with state-mandated housing
goals.
Regional inclusionary housing schemes usually require
a percentage of housing units affordable to an established
median income guideline as a condition of residential
development permitting in a given area. 250 For instance,
Montgomery County, Maryland, passed a Moderately
Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) ordinance which mandates
that 15% of all new development over fifty units must go to
moderate-income buyers or renters. 251 Additional affordable
housing comes through a provision allowing the county's
Housing Opportunities Commission-the public
housing
252
authority-to purchase up to a third of the units.
A second approach maintains regional fair share
housing allocations by imposing obligations through
comprehensive plan elements, which must be periodically
submitted by municipalities to regional authorities created
by state legislation and meet established regional housing
needs at different income levels. 253 This planning regulation

250. See NICK BRUNICK ET AL., LARGE CITIES AND INCLUSIONARY ZONING 5

(2003), http://www.bpichicago.org/rah/pubs/keeping-forsale.pdf;

KAREN DESTOREL

BROWN, EXPANDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING THROUGH INCLUSIONARY ZONING:
LESSONS FROM THE WASHINGTON
METROPOLITAN AREA
18-19 (2001),

http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/es/urban/publications/inclusionary.pdf
(explaining that inclusionary schemes can be required at either the local or
regional level).
251. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A-1 (2006); see also RUSK, supra

note 217, at 186-90.
252. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A-1 (2006). Builders can
negotiate density bonuses in exchange. RUSK, supra note 217, at 188. Low- to
moderate-income buyers may sell their subsidized units after ten years, but a
portion of the proceeds must go to the county's revolving Housing Initiative
Fund. See id. at 189-90.
253. Cf. Daniel R. Mandelker, Twists In The Path From Mount Laurel: The
Affordable Housing Element in Comprehensive Plans, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.

REV. 555, 565 (2003) (arguing that the practice may overstate the availability of
land in older suburbs and concerned that imposing affordable housing may
contribute to sprawl).
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combines consistency requirements with regional equity.
For instance, California requires municipalities to submit a
housing element-as well as others-which includes an
extensive housing needs inventory and goals statement for
the locality relative to the surrounding region. 254 The
housing element is then part of a city's regional fair share
allocation. 255 In New Jersey, the famed Mt. Laurel fair
share housing litigation 256 was ultimately reduced to a
legislative scheme for regional affordability allocations with
many of the same features. 257 Unfortunately, the state
legislature's inclusion of a localist provision and regional
254. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583 (West 2006), which states:
The housing element shall consist of an identification and analysis of
existing and projected housing needs and a statement of goals, policies,
quantified objectives, financial resources, and scheduled programs for
the preservation, improvement, and development of housing. The
housing element shall identify adequate sites for housing, including
rental housing, factory-built housing, and mobilehomes, and shall
make adequate provision for the existing and projected needs of all
economic segments of the community.
Massachusetts makes similar requirements, including an extensive array of
required elements. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 81D (West 2007).
Elements include, among others, land use, housing, economic development,
natural and cultural resources, open space and recreation, and circulation. Id.
255. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65584 (West 2007) provides in part:
(d) The regional housing needs allocation plan shall be consistent with
all of the following objectives:
(1) Increasing the housing supply and the mix of housing types,
tenure, and affordability in all cities and counties within the region in
an equitable manner, which shall result in each jurisdiction receiving
an allocation of units for low and very low income households.
(2) Promoting infill development and socioeconomic equity, the
protection of environmental and agricultural resources, and the
encouragement of efficient development patterns.
(3) Promoting an improved intraregional relationship between jobs
and housing.
(4) Allocating a lower proportion of housing need to an income
category when a jurisdiction already has a disproportionately high
share of households in that income category, as compared to the
countywide distribution of households in that category from the most
recent decennial United States census.
256. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975) (Mt. Laurel 1); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mt. Laurel II).
257. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to 329 (West 2007).
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contribution agreements largely undermined the fair share
scheme by permitting municipalities to buy out up to half
their designated housing obligations and reconcentrating
those affordable units-at a discount-in the state's already
overburdened cities. 258 The Mt. Laurel experience remains a
cautionary reminder about the level of political resistance
localities will mount in order to avoid affordable housing
obligations under regional governance. 259 In recognition of
these political realities, at least one commentator has
argued in favor of a system of housing incentives under
which resistant localities paid the equivalent of a tax for
avoiding their desegregation obligations; 260 New Jersey may
already demonstrate that many suburban municipalities
are willing to pay such costs as the price of continued local
control.
The benefits of economic and racial desegregation
through either of the means discussed above are reflected
by a single empirical fact about concentrated urban poverty:
It is virtually unknown to the white poor. In fact, in New
Orleans, while 43% of blacks lived in concentrated poverty,
258. Id. § 52:27D-312; see Joel Norwood, Trading Affordable Housing
Obligations: Selling a Civic Duty or Buying Efficient Development?, 39 CONN. L.
REV. 347, 372-73 (2006); Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1228-29 (2006); Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial
Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 313-14
(2002); John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1685, 1688-90 (1998).
259. See, e.g., Nicole Garnett, Trouble PreservingParadise, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 158, 166 (2001); David D. Troutt, Mount Laurel and Urban Possibility, 27
SETON HALL L. REV. 1471, 1475-77 (1997).
260. See John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A
Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1574
(1993). Under his proposed National Fair Share Act, Professor Boger would
include the following provision:
As an incentive, the Act would promise to disperse new federal housing
funds through state governments to all municipalities that choose to
shoulder their "fair share" housing obligations. As a disincentive, this
legislation would modify the federal tax code so that property holders
in municipalities that choose to ignore their prescribed housing goals
would progressively lose their mortgage interest and property tax
deductions. These tax code modifications would have a dual purpose:
First, to prompt citizens to encourage municipalities to comply with
federal law, thereby hastening metropolitan integration; second, to
reverse the economic advantages that currently flow toward property
holders in segregated communities.
Id. at 1574.
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only 11% of whites did. 261 Instead, poor whites are
economically integrated in more moderate- and middleincome neighborhoods and localities. This means they share
in many of the same social capital inputs-schools,
recreation, economic investment, role models, employment
opportunities, etc.-enjoyed by more affluent neighbors.
The white poor cannot be ignored politically and their
political interests are nevertheless shared by others in the
locality. Although the causal link is not exact, poor whites
do not stay persistently poor-they acquire more wealth
than the minority poor and enjoy greater better economic
mobility over their lives. 262 Hence, from the experience of
the white poor, economic integration-or social and political
resource sharing-alone seems to be a significant factor in
improving life chances and mobility. Further, the spatial
coexistence between poor whites and middle-class whites
demonstrates that poverty alone does not doom property
values, destroy a tax base, or ruin schools.
2. Revenue Balance/Tax Base Sharing. Tax base
sharing is almost the conceptual antidote to the
concentration effects of wealth and poverty exacerbated by
the localist compulsion toward fiscal zoning. Where
localities find it prudent to attract "good ratables" such as
easily taxed commercial and industrial properties and to
repel "bad ratables" such as low- and moderate-income
26 3
housing for families in need of costly public services,
regional tax base sharing changes the logic by deemphasizing the primacy of jurisdictional borders. Rather
than measuring one municipality's ability to successfully
compete against its neighbors for good ratables and, in the
in
process, create costly region-wide externalities
infrastructure, traffic, pollution, and sprawl, the regional
and the norm of
interest is made paramount
intergovernmental competition is replaced with a more
equitable and efficient norm of intergovernmental cooperation.
There are two essential methods that are applied
statutorily to defined regions within a state. One is to
261. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 7.
262. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 15, at 123-42; see also supra note
108 and accompanying text.
263. For more on municipalities' ratables compulsion, see Briffault, supra
note 221, at 1136.
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create a baseline tax valuation for commercial and
industrial development, and every increase in value over
time as well as new developments are subject to an
assessment for a regional fund. 264 Distributions from the
fund are made according to a formula that allows
municipalities with high services costs but limited tax base
to participate in a nearby community's gains. 265 The second
approach is similar, but uses appreciating residential
values as the property taxes subject to the regional
distribution formula. 266 In addition to providing a balancing
source of revenues for tax poor municipalities, tax base
sharing may rein in the forces of decline even among
municipalities who win short-term fiscal zoning contests
267
but lose in the long term through low-density sprawl.
The premier example of property tax base sharing as a
feature of equitable regionalism is the fiscal disparities
legislation enacted by the Minnesota legislature in 1971.268
The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act requires
each taxing jurisdiction in a seven-county area to contribute to a
regional pool forty percent of the growth in the value of its
commercial-industrial tax capacity. Municipalities are assigned a
portion of that pool, based on population and the ratio of the total
market value of property per capita in the jurisdiction to the

264. American Planning Association, Tax Equity Devices and Tax Relief
Programs,in GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK 14-1, 14-6 (Stuart Meck

ed. 2003) availableat http://www.planning.org/guidebookhtm/chapter-fourteenl.htm
[hereinafter APA GROWING SMART GUIDEBOOK].
265. Id. Chapter 14 also contains useful illustrative formulas, calculations,
and model legislation. Id. at 14-1 to -7.
266. Id.; see also ORFIELD, supra note 221, at 85.
267. ORFIELD, supra note 221.. According to Orfield:
In itself, intrametropolitan competition for tax base harms the entire
region, not just the city that loses. When cities engage in bidding wars
for businesses that have already chosen to locate in a region, public
monies are used to improve one community's fiscal position and
services at the expense of another's well being. Businesses can take
advantage of this competition to shed social responsibilities. By
threatening to leave, they can force troubled communities to pay them
to stay.
Id. at 86-87.
268. The Charles R. Weaver Metropolitan Revenue Distribution Act, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 473F.01-.08 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007).
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269
average market value of property per capita in the region.

In 2000, Orfield reported that sharing under the Act
had reduced interlocal tax base disparities by about twenty
percent; in cities of more than 9,000 people, the ratio 270
of
disparity had declined from sixteen-to-one to four-to-one.
Orfield notes that the program would be even stronger if a
greater percentage of commercial tax base valuation were
included in the collection formula and if it could also draw
from rising home values. 271 Further, it is not clear to what
extent the Minnesota program would work to alter racial
segregation-or if it would be politically viable at all-in a
metropolitan area with a more substantial black
population. 272 In 2000, the proportion of blacks in the
Minneapolis metropolitan area was only 6.1%.273 By
contrast, blacks made up 37.7% of the New Orleans
metropolitan area during the same period.
C. Comprehensive Planningand Neighborhood
Participation
Equitable regionalism is not a workable principle for
cities and their poor unless certain localist structures are in
place to ensure that cities plan comprehensively and with
269. Myron Orfield & Nicholas Wallace, The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities
Act of 1971: The Twin Cities' Struggle and Blueprint for Regional Cooperation,
33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 591, 592 (2007).

270. Id. at 603.
271. ORFIELD, supra note 221, at 87. Minnesota is not the only state to

experiment with tax revenue sharing legislation. In 1968, for example, the New
Jersey legislature passed a tax base sharing law for the creation of a
Hackensack Meadowlands District, which covered fourteen municipalities
around the marshlands supporting the Meadowlands sports complex.
Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:14-60 to -76 (West 2003); APA GROWING SMART GUIDEBOOK, supra note
264. "The plan's intent was to compensate those municipalities for the fiscal
impact of land-use decisions made by the commission. Each municipality
contributes to an 'intermunicipal account' in an amount equal to a percentage of
increases in assessed valuation of property within the district, starting from the
base year of 1970." Id.
272. Cashin offers a similar, though broader, caveat about regionalist
experiments in Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, supra note 17, at 2037.
273. Lois M. QUINN & JOHN PAWASARAT, RACIAL INTEGRATION IN URBAN
AMERICA: A BLOCK LEVEL ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN AND WHITE HOUSING
PATTERNS

8 (2003), http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/ETI/integration/integration.htm.
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the maximum participation of all their residents. In the
abstract, participatory planning is localism's greatest
strength, because the community's will about health, safety,
and welfare is transformed into rational processes that tend
to protect the broadest range of stakeholder interests. In
theory, the danger of a professionalized planning elite
running away with delegated powers is offset by an
informed, often vigilant electorate as well as by the legal
strictures associated with comprehensive planningspecifically, the requirement that zoning decisions, for
instance, be consistent with a master plan-the consistency
or "force of law" requirement. Not all localities follow these
rules; not all states impose them. Many, like Louisiana, do
not mandate that local land use regulation conform to
comprehensive planning goals, or even that the latter be
adopted. In sufficiently small, especially suburban,
municipalities, where interest in land use decision making
is fairly uniform among residents, such localist "planning"
schemes, focused largely on zoning and exercised through
local zoning ordinances, are adequate to protect homeowner
stakeholders.
Yet in larger cities whose residents would most benefit
from the protections of rational planning processes and the
formal participation of the public in determining
community character, comprehensive planning is rare,
often an afterthought. This is a problem for democracy as
well as for cities. Localism need not be viewed merely as a
means by which homogeneous communities sustain
parochial interests against change from outsiders. Localism
can and should tap the energy and resources of residents,
particularly at the neighborhood level where differences
may be most dynamic, access to information is more equal,
and where a true fabric of community may be most
274
effectively sewn through the exchange of experiences.
The formal participation process may take many forms, but
an established model is comprehensive planning. The
primary benefit of promoting comprehensive planning at
neighborhood levels is goal-setting, which is itself
impossible without an exchange of information about what
currently exists in an area, an assessment of needs and a
274. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization,60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253,

273-79 (1993) (arguing that citizens feel the strongest pull toward participation
in their immediate neighborhoods).
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frank, professional disclosure of constraints. Comprehensive
planning in this manner can develop even a low-income
area's sense of collective voice, political empowerment and a
future orientation necessary to any notion of stakeholdership.
With the aid of professional planners, as discussed below in
the New Orleans rebuilding context, and a regulatory
scheme demanding legal compliance with the resulting
master plan, communities may strengthen themselves
against the vagaries of unforgiving political and economic
markets, rather than appear defensively at the crisis point
of an unwanted environmental threat or a mysterious wave
of displacing gentrification. Of greatest importance here,
in
engage
communities
regularly
whose
cities
comprehensive planning with the force of law are better
situated to see themselves in a regional context and to
contribute to and gain from processes of equitable
regionalism. 275 Larger cities that do not structure planning
rules to have the force of law risk alienating residents as a
result of vesting ultimate decisionmaking power within the
accountability is
discretion of local elected officials where
276
hampered by a lack of transparency.
New Orleans had no such tradition of local
comprehensive planning and citizen participation until
Katrina destroyed the city. After several fits and starts, a
process-still underway-entitled the Unified New Orleans
Plan was undertaken. Although efforts to give this model of
public participation the force of law sufficient to overcome a
studied tradition of council-manic zoning discretion and
weak neighborhood inputs are incomplete at this writing,
the broad ideas bear brief mention here.
The Unified New Orleans Plan 277 (UNOP) appears to be
the latest, and final effort to create a comprehensive
rebuilding plan, and was officially endorsed on July 5,
275. See generally Peter Marcuse, Rebuilding a Tortured Past or Creatinga
Model Future: The Limits and Potentials of Planning, in THERE Is No SUCH
THING AS A NATIONAL DISASTER, supra note 216, at 271 (discussing the variety of
productive roles planners can assume and the socioeconomic effects of more
equity-minded strategies).
276. See infra note 283.
277. See
UNIFIED
CITYWIDE
STRATEGIC

DRAFT
PLAN,
FINAL
NEW
ORLEANS
PLAN
AND
REBUILDING
RECOVERY

OF
THE
(2007),

http://www.unifiedneworleansplan.com/home2/ (providing a link to each section
of the report).

2008]

KATRINA'S WINDOW

1185

2006.278 The plan's Community Support Organization was
to coordinate a plan for each of the city's thirteen
districts. 279 Because a major focus of UNOP was to
incorporate community feedback and ensure the planning
process was "resident-driven," 28 0 this planning process
involved various city-wide meetings. In addition to the
various planners assigned to each individual district, a citywide planning team was also created 281 in order "to both
issue criteria for drafting the district plans and to produce
'282
the single, unified document at the end of the process.
After collecting public response and gathering information
and
teams, the
findings
through the
planning
report
now
collected
in
a
five-section
recommendations 28were
3
known as UNOP.

278. Press Release, City of New Orleans Mayor's Office, City Council and
Civic Leaders Reach Accord; "Unified New Orleans Neighborhood Plan" To
Guide Rebuilding Process For City (July 5, 2006), available at
The
http://www.rockfound.org/about us/pressreleases/2006/nopr70506.pdf.
responsibility of oversight for this plan belongs to the New Orleans Community
Support Foundation (NOCSF), a six member board, and subsidiary of the
Greater New Orleans Foundation (GNOF). The NOCSF was responsible for
staffing the process. They began by hiring the architecture firm, Concordia,
which put an advisory board in place called the Community Support
Organization (CSO). The CSO consists of nine members. See UNOP, What is
New
Orleans
Plan,
http://unifiedneworleansplan.com/
the
Unified
home2/section/22/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). The composition of the board
includes "one appointee each from the Mayor's office, the New Orleans City
Council, the City Planning Commission, the Greater New Orleans Foundation,
and five members representing the community from each of the five City
Council districts." Press Release, UNOP, Community Support Organization
Members Announced; Assignments for District and Neighborhood Planning (Aug. 28,
2006), available at http://thinknola.com/w/images/l/le/ Membersannounced-0828-06-19600.pdf. The CSO "was organized as a new governance model bringing
the community directly into the decision making process of the city's planning
initiative." Id. The CSO was in place to "oversee all major steps within the
planning process," and would be in charge of selecting and overseeing the work
of planning teams. Id.
279. Press Release, UNOP, supra note 278.
280. Coleman Warner, Major Grants for N.O. Depend on Consensus,
NOLA.coM, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.nola.com/newslogs/topnews/index.ssf?/
mtlogs/nola-topnews/archives/200608_07.html.
281. UNOP, Meet the Citywide Team, http://unifiedneworleansplan.com/
home2/section/23-108/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
282. NOLAplans, Detailed Description of UNOP, http://www.nolaplans.com/
unopdetail/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
283. The first section, entitled "Recovery Assessment" discusses New
Orleans' outlay prior to the storm, as well as the division of the thirteen
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While many praise UNOP for involving New
28 4
Orleanians and sharing the process with the community,
many more remain skeptical and some communities angry
about the planning process. 28 5 The skepticism surrounds
planning districts. UNOP, http://www.willdoo-storage.com/Plans/CityWide/
UNOPFINALI.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). It provides maps of the districts
and neighborhoods and a brief overview of Katrina's physical impact with maps
depicting the flooded areas. The second section, called "Citywide Recovery
Framework" provides various plans and predictions involved in the UNOP
process. UNOP, http://www.willdoo-storage.com/plans/CityWide[UNOPFINAL_2.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2007). It estimates population growth over the next ten
years and assesses what the planning implications may be given such
estimates. Id. It divides the assessments based on five drainage basins, each of
which encompass anywhere from one to seven districts. Id. This section outlines
seven recovery goals and provides three recovery scenarios: (1) "Re-pair"; (2)
"Re-habilitate"; and (3) "Re-vision." Id. The section incorporates community
feedback on the various scenarios gathered from the community meetings. Id.
The third section, "Summary of Recovery Projects," provides an overview of the
"recovery policies, programs, and projects." UNOP, http://www.willdoo-storage.coml
plans/CityWideJUNOPFINAL_3.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). It divides the
projects by sectors and provides charts for each sector that compares citywide
plans for each sector, to the individual district plans that are necessary for, and
correspond to, the citywide project. Id. It also includes a timeline for
implementation and UNOP's prioritization criteria for each project. Id. Section
four begins with an implementation timeline across three phases of the project:
(1) short-term, which shows the required investment between 2007 and 2009;
(2) mid-term, which shows the required investment between 2009 and 2011;
and (3) long-term, which shows the required investment between 2012 and
2016. UNOP, http://www.willdoo-storage.com/Plans/CityWideIUNOPFINAL_4.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2007). It outlines the necessary oversight for the rebuilding
process, and calls for collaboration between various local authorities. Id. More
importantly, however, this section encourages new zoning and regulatory
approaches. Id. It suggests updates to the existing Master Plan and the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance. Id. The final section of the plan is the
financial section. It breaks down the total $4.1 billion of estimated costs based
on the various sectors and shows the approximate costs for the next two years,
the next five years, and the costs that stretch beyond five years. UNOP,
http://www.willdoo-storage.comlPlans/CityWideJUNOPFINAL_5.pdf (last visited
Oct. 1, 2007). This section also discusses the general strategies in place to
secure funding, listing the various governmental-state and federal-agencies
that are potential funding sources, as well as the various private entities that
have or may contribute to UNOP. Id.
284. See James S. Russell, $14 Billion New Orleans Plan May Strand
Neighborhoods, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com
apps/news?pid=emailen&refer=muse&sid=awsINO3BZSDs.
285. See, e.g., Manuel Roig-Franzia, Hostility Greets KatrinaRecovery Plan,
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 12, 2006, available at, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/11/AR2006011102146.html
(describing the
community's outrage to UNOP's proposed moratorium on the city's most
damaged neighborhoods).
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the plan's feasibility, and the anger relates to the impact
this plan will have on lower income families. 28 6 Their
criticisms have merit insofar as they critique processes
which fail to restructure a local planning and political
structure that is both outdated and parochial in its
priorities. Its chief problem is the lack of a consistency
requirement between planning initiatives and a comprehensive
plan-a product of a weak planning commission and a
strong city council. 28 7 However, the process of planning,
review, and critique by experts around the country has
revealed a great deal about the fault lines in city planning
and participatory democracy in New Orleans, which may
not be unique to the city. 28 8 Despite the criticism, the
286. For example, one organization focused on New Orleans' poor,
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), released its
own plan. ACORN HOUSING/UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIP, A PEOPLES' PLAN FOR
OVERCOMING THE HURRICANE KATRINA BLUES: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR
BUILDING A MORE VIBRANT, SUSTAINABLE, AND EQUITABLE 9TH WARD (2007),

http://aap.cornell.edu/aap/crp/outreach/nopi/upload/PeoplesPlan for 9th Ward.pdf.
According to ACORN, the district planning teams were not required to address
issues such as health care, public safety, building codes, transportation,
economic development, land use, and institutional development-i.e., the
infrastructure of community development. Id. at 7.
287. As has been stated:
Unlike its counterparts in most other American cities, the [City
Planning] Commission does not have the force of law behind its
decisions, meaning that all development and infrastructure proposals
are vetted by the notoriously political City Council that has already
demonstrated hostility to the UNOP process. [However] [e]ven if its
decisions did have legal standing, the City Planning Commission is
currently operating with less than half of its pre-storm staff, and is
unlikely to serve as an effective advocate for city rebuilding without a
major overhaul and infusion of resources.
JEDIDIAH HORNE & BRENDAN NEE, AN OVERVIEW OF POST-KATRINA PLANNING IN
NEW ORLEANS 12 (2006), http://www.bnee.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/
AnOverview of theUnifiedNewOrleansPlanningProcess.pdf.
288. As ACORN further observed:
The City's current zoning ordinance was prepared at a time when local
planners expected the city's extractive, manufacturing, transportation,
retail, financial, and tourism industries to continue to grow, albeit at a
modest pace, and the residential neighborhoods to remain stable.
The 9th Ward is zoned to accommodate: moderate density residential
development; neighborhood-oriented retail; three east-west commercial
corridors; major industrial areas; significant rail, barge, and shiprelated transportation functions; and a small number of public open
spaces. Recent declines in the region's oil and gas, shipping, and
assembly industries have left the 9th Ward with large swaths of
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UNOP process and the others undertaken in the alternative
illustrate the beginnings of a potentially formidable urban
planning infrastructure capable of providing the democratic
foundation at the neighborhood level that is a practical
precondition to effective equitable regionalism.
D. Barriers to Reform
The foregoing proposals' normative appeal is certain to
suffer prudential constraints, given the analysis of
resistance, rationality, and cultural distance that preceded
it. To the extent that my analysis in this difficult context
proposes a fruitful coalition of state-wide interests to
dismantle structures of racial and economic disadvantage
based on facts, I acknowledge the persuasive impotence of
providing more information. 289 I am also aware that the
inherently political nature of these proposed reforms may
lead to death
by popular referenda, if not by state
290
legislatures.
underutilized and, in some cases, heavily-polluted industrial areas....
Economic declines in the above-mentioned industries in recent years
have undermined the economic opportunities for workers in these
industrial sectors, causing many to seek employment elsewhere. This
factor, along with the development of newer suburban developments
offering larger homes, better infrastructure, and improved schools and
municipal services, has resulted in a slow but steady decline in the 9th
Ward's residential population....

The post-disaster planning recovery efforts required by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita provide residents, business owners, and elected
officials from the 9th Ward with the opportunity to work with city
planners to revise the area's zoning ordinance in response to long-term
economic and demographic trends, Katrina and Rita impacts, and
contemporary and future building trends and land use patterns.
ACORN HOUSING/UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIP, supra note 286, at 18-19.
289. Cheryl I. Harris and Devon W. Carbado make a similar argument in
their brilliant analysis of the way the national news media characterized white
Katrina survivors during the New Orleans floods--"finding"-and black ones"looting"-asserting instead that something other than facts are necessary to
alter cognitive frames. Harris & Carbado, supra note 4, at 88.
290. For two analyses of the various local and state political constraints
influencing workforce housing development and housing desegregation, see
John J. Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland and
Throughout the Nation: Do Land Use Regulations That Preclude Reasonable
Housing Opportunity Based Upon Income Violate the Individual Liberties
Protected by State Constitutions, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 153, 187-190 (2004) and

Philip D. Tegeler, Housing Segregation and Local Discretion, 3 J.L. & POL'Y
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Hopefully, three more facts make the present situation
different than failed efforts of the past. First, we may be
approaching the end-game in terms of the ability to simply
develop more state lands while abandoning others. Beyond
the sheer waste and environmental degradation that occurs
through leapfrogging sprawl, there is finitude for every
flight strategy. Second, as Cashin, Orfield, and others make
clear, the fiscal problems occurring in many suburbs
compared to a state's favored quarters may fuel demands
for greater transparency about the distribution of state
revenues and resources. Illuminating systemic crosssubsidization, therefore, promises the possibility of classbased coalitions seeking regional fairness-along with
significant opposition-which has worked before. 291 Third,
with a clearer mutuality of interests, regional equity
coalitions should attract many more politically powerful
interests, including smart-growth, transportation alternatives,
and environmental advocates. If so, out of decades of
structural inequity may come the transformative
realization that often what is good for the state's poor also
benefits its middle-class.
CONCLUSION

The worst national disaster in United States history
also showcased the dire consequences of localism as the
cultural and legal successor to segregation. Long before
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf Coast,
New Orleans' status as an exceptional city had been lost to
Americanizing trends. Its resistance to the conventional
racial binary was overcome after Reconstruction; its unique
densities and accommodation of the physical landscape
were transformed into sprawling divisions by technology
and suburbanization. From the Brown decision forward, I
have argued in this Article, New Orleans and the
metropolitan area around it developed much like the rest of
the nation. Localist tendencies combined with legal
209, 212-27 (1994).
291. See, e.g., Lassiter, supra note 200, at 120-43 (describing Charlotte,
North Carolina's successful busing equalization coalitions of whites and blacks
in the early 1970s). For an analysis of when affordable housing strategies find a
favorable reception in suburban communities, see GEORGE C. GALSTER ET AL.,
WHY NOT IN MY BACKYARD?: NEIGHBORHOOD IMPACTS OF DECONCENTRATING
ASSISTED HOUSING (2003).
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protections for local autonomy-as exemplified and
supported by several key decisions of the Burger Court-to
resegregate the region. A decade before Katrina, New
Orleans, like most central cities, was financially incapable
of deconcentrating neighborhoods of persistent poverty and
politically powerless to wrest a more equitable sharing of
state fiscal resources and burdens from its neighboring
parishes.
This analytic focus on the role of legal localism in
resegregating America's metropolitan regions suggests its
own remedial principle: equitable regionalism. Under this
principle of state legislative reform, political coalitions may
be possible in joining the interests of antipoverty, fair
housing, and community development advocates with their
counterparts in smart-growth, environmental preservation,
and antisprawl organizations. Urban neighborhoods
chronically destabilized by poverty need localism's emphasis
on participation through planning devices; similar devices
may help to effectuate equitable regional goals. The current
anti-majoritarian rules have weakened both cities and a
great many suburbs, suggesting ultimately that what
benefits the isolated urban poor may also improve the
welfare of the suburban middle-class.

